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“SMILE – YOU’RE ON CELLPHONE CAMERA!”: 
REGULATING ONLINE PRIVACY IN THE MYSPACE GENERATION 
 
JACQUELINE D. LIPTON* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the latest Batman movie,1 Bruce Wayne’s corporate right hand man, 
Lucius Fox, copes stoically with the death and destruction dogging his boss.  
Interestingly, the last straw for him is Bruce’s request that he use digital 
video surveillance created through the city’s cellphone network to spy on the 
people of Gotham City in order to locate the Joker.  Does this tell us 
something about the increasing social importance of privacy, particularly in 
an age where digital video technology is ubiquitous and largely 
unregulated? 
 
While much digital privacy law and commentary has focused on text files 
containing personal data, little attention has been paid to privacy interests in 
video files that may portray individuals in an unflattering or embarrassing 
light.  As digital video technology is now becoming widespread in the hands 
of the public, this focus needs to shift.   Once a small percentage of online 
content, digital video images are now appearing online at an exponential 
rate.  This is largely due to the growth of online video sharing services such 
as YouTube, MySpace, Flickr, and Facebook.  The sharing of images online 
is now a global phenomenon – as is the lack of explicit legal protection for 
privacy rights in these images.   
 
This article examines the extent to which we do, or should, have privacy 
rights in digital video content.  It then considers the most effective approach 
for regulating online video privacy.  It suggests that pure legal regulation, 
without more, is unlikely to be up to the task.  Instead, a combination of 
regulatory modalities will be required to effectively protect privacy interests 
in digital video files.  These modalities will likely include the four regulatory 
modalities previously identified by Professor Lawrence Lessig:  legal rules, 
social norms, system architecture, and market forces.  Additionally, new 
regulatory modalities may need to be developed.  These might include public 
education and non-profit institutions recognized in a regulatory role.   
 
                                                 
*
  Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Law, Technology and the Arts, Associate Director, 
Frederick K Cox International Law Center, Director, Cyberspace Law and Policy Office, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, 11075 East Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio 44106, USA, Email:  
Jacqueline.Lipton@case.edu, Fax:  (216) 368 2086.  For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, 
the author would like to thank Professor Andrea Matwyshyn and participants at a panel on user-generated 
content and privacy at “Computers, Freedom and Privacy ‘08” at Yale University on May 21, 2008, as well 
as participants at the 8th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars’ Conference at Stanford Law School on 
August 7-8, 2008.  Thanks are also due to Josephina Manifold for her excellent research assistance.  All 
mistakes and omissions are, of course, my own. 
1
  The Dark Knight, Warner Bros. Pictures, 2008. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
New technologies are radically advancing our freedoms, but they are also enabling 
unparalleled invasions of privacy. 
 
- Electronic Frontier Foundation2 
 
Not that long ago on a subway train in South Korea, a woman’s dog rather 
infamously pooped on the floor of a subway carriage.  The woman refused to clean the 
mess even after being offered a tissue by a fellow traveler, and the rest is Internet 
history.3  Another fellow traveler took photos of her with a cellphone camera.  These 
photographs were quickly posted on a popular Korean blog.  The purpose of the posting 
was to shame her.4  Ultimately, the humiliation attached to this incident resulted in a 
firestorm of criticism directed at her which caused her to quit her job.5  This story is one 
of a number of recent episodes illustrating the way in which a person’s privacy can be 
obliterated at the push of a button by the use of the simplest and most ubiquitous 
combination of digital technologies – the cellphone camera and the Internet.6  In these 
episodes,7 we see a new trend in online conduct:  peers intruding into each other’s privacy 
with video and, more generally, multi-media, files.8   
 
The phenomenon of online networking, including the sharing of multi-media files, 
has recently attracted some media attention,9 particularly because it is an area that is 
largely unregulated.  Current online privacy regulations focus on the collation and 
                                                 
2
  Electronic Frontier Foundation, Privacy, available at http://www.eff.org/issues/privacy, last 
viewed on May 12, 2008. 
3
  JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT, 211 (2008). 
4
  DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION:  GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 
(2007) (hereinafter, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION), at 1. 
5
  ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211. 
6
  id., at 99 (“One holder of a mobile phone camera can irrevocably compromise someone else’s 
privacy …”) 
7
  id., at 211 (discussion of “Star Wars kid” episode and “Bus Uncle” episode);  SOLOVE, THE 
FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 43-48 (discussion of “Little Fatty” and “Star Wars Kid” 
examples about video-based privacy invasions that potentially harm an individual’s reputation or cause 
embarrassment and humiliation). 
8
  See also Andrew McClurg, Kiss and Tell:  Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through 
Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L REV 887, 927 (2006) (“[T]echnology has made it much 
easier for people to take embarrassing pictures of others, both with and without consent, and to widely 
disseminate them via the Internet.”); 928 (“Digital cameras and camcorders are specifically designed to be 
connected to computers and to deliver pictures across worldwide networks in an instant.”); ZITTRAIN, supra 
note ___, at 221 (“The central problem [for regulating privacy on the Internet] is that the organizations 
creating, maintaining, using, and disseminating records of identifiable personal data are no longer just 
“organizations” – they are people who take pictures and stream them online, who blog about their reactions 
to a lecture or a class or a meal, and who share on social sites rich descriptions of their friends and 
interactions.”) 
9
  See, for example, Kim Hart, A Flashy Facebook Page at a Cost to Privacy, THE WASHINGTON 
POST, June 12, 2008 (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/11/AR2008061103759.html, last viewed on July 21, 2008) (discussing privacy 
issues with Facebook generally).   
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dissemination of text-based digital dossiers comprising personal information,10 rather than 
online video images.  This is unsurprising, given the fact that the widespread availability 
of inexpensive digital video sharing technology is a relatively recent phenomenon.11  It is 
now almost trite to say that the Internet poses significant risks to privacy.  In the past, 
these risks have been characterized as involving the collection, use, and dissemination of 
text-based personal information by governments,12 businesses,13 health care providers,14 
Internet intermediaries,15 and prospective employers.16  Today, we can add concerns about 
unauthorized uses of our personal information by our peers over networks such as 
MySpace,17 Facebook,18 Flickr,19 and Youtube.20  Much of this information is in video 
form.21     
 
                                                 
10
  See discussion in Part II.A.3 infra. 
11
  Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARVARD JOURNAL OF 
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 5 (2007) (describing some of these new technologies available in the online 
world); Bobby White, Cisco Projects Growth to Swell for Online Video, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 
16, 2008, available at:  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121358372172676391.html, last viewed on June 16, 
2008) (“Cisco Systems Inc. is projecting a sixfold jump in Internet traffic between 2007 and 2012, as online 
video becomes the biggest driver of global data communications.”) 
12
  Professor Solove has, in fact, devoted a large part of a book to these issues:  Solove, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON, Part III:  Government Access (2004) (hereinafter, “THE DIGITAL PERSON”) 
13
  id., at 4 (“Computers enable marketers to collect detailed dossiers of personal information and to 
analyze it to predict the consumer’s behavior.  Through various analytic techniques, marketers construct 
models of what products particular customers will desire and how to encourage customers to consume.  
Companies know how we spend our money, what we do for a living, how much we earn, and where we 
live.  They know about our ethnic backgrounds, religion, political views, and health problems.  Not only do 
companies know what we have already purchased, but they also have a good idea about what books we will 
soon buy or what movies we will want to see.”) 
14
  See, for example, Sharona Hoffman and Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace:  
Protecting the Security Of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 331 
(2007). 
15
  See, for example, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy? Proposed Google/Doubleclick 
Deal, available at http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/ , last viewed on July 21, 2008 (expressing concern 
about ability of Internet intermediaries such as search engine Google and Internet advertising firm 
Doubleclick to monitor users’ online behavior in the context of proposed merger negotiations between 
Google and Doubleclick).   
16
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 203 (discussing employers’ practices 
with respect to ascertaining and using online information about prospective hires). 
17
  MySpace is a social networking service where individuals can search for and communicate with 
old and new friends: see www.myspace.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008. 
18
  Facebook describes itself as a “social utility that connects you with the people around you.”:  
www.facebook.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008. 
19
  Flickr describes itself as “almost certainly the best online photo management and sharing 
application in the world”:  www.flickr.com, last viewed on July 22, 2008. 
20
  YouTube is an online file sharing service for video files:  www.youtube.com, last viewed on July 
22, 2008.  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 40 (“Anybody can post videos of 
anybody else on YouTube.  People can post pictures of you or write about you in their blogs.  Even if you 
aren’t exhibiting your private life online, it may still wind up being exposed by somebody else.”) 
21
  ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 221 (noting that new threats to privacy online arise from peer based 
multimedia content being disseminated on the Internet, as opposed to the traditional threats where 
organizations collated text based data about private individuals). 
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Current online privacy regulations have two things in common.  The first is their 
predominant focus on text-based records.22  The second is their goal of regulating data in 
the hands of institutions that deal with personal information in the course of commercial, 
governmental, or professional activities.23  The current regulatory matrix is not aimed at 
protecting individuals from peer-based privacy incursions that involve video images.  
This regulatory approach made sense when uses of private information on the Internet 
were largely confined to text-based compilations of personal information by government 
and private enterprises.  Now there is a need for new approaches to accommodate 
concerns about peer-based intrusions into online privacy, particularly through the 
uploading and dissemination of video files.  While a picture is worth a thousand words, 
an image of an individual in an embarrassing situation might well affect her chances of 
employment,24 education, or health insurance25 if widely disseminated online.26 
 
This Article considers the need for a broader approach to online privacy 
regulation that takes account of these new developments.  It also considers the 
appropriate form for such regulation, noting in particular that a traditional “command and 
control” regulatory approach27 on its own is unlikely to be particularly effective in this 
context.  Rather, it suggests a combination of approaches involving multiple regulatory 
                                                 
22
  Sánchez Abril, supra note ___, at 5 (“Much of the legal debate about privacy on the Internet has 
previously centered on personally identifiable data, like a person’s address, social security number, 
spending habits, and financial information.”). 
23
  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 13-21 (describing historical growth of 
databases in the governmental and commercial context).   
24
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 38 (“Employers are looking at social 
network site profiles of prospective employees.  Microsoft officials admit to trolling the Internet for 
anything they can find out about people they are considering for positions.”) 
25
  For example, a picture of a person smoking, or entering an HIV clinic. 
26
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 38 (“Employers are looking at social 
network site profiles of prospective employees.  Microsoft officials admit to trolling the Internet for 
anything they can find out about people they are considering for positions.”)  On the other hand, there is 
some suggestion that the widespread availability of personal information online cannot be stopped and 
might actually be beneficial to society.  See, for example, Lior Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation:  Law in an 
Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, forthcoming, 
October 2008 (arguing that basing decisions on real information rather than dangerous and discriminatory 
proxies such as race actually provides social benefits overall) (hereinafter, “Reputation Nation”).   
27
  Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L REV 313, 320 
(2006) (explaining command and control regulatory approach in the environmental context as a 
government setting a particular standard with which targeted actors are required to comply).   
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modalities, such as legal rules, social norms,28 system architecture,29 market forces,30 
public education, and private institutions.31   
 
Part II identifies gaps in current privacy regulations both in the United States and 
the European Union with respect to peer-based privacy incursions involving video 
technology.  Part III suggests the development of new forms of regulation to bridge these 
gaps.  In so doing, it advocates the interplay32 of a variety of regulatory modalities 
including the four modalities of cyberspace regulation identified by Professor Lawrence 
Lessig:  legal rules, social norms, system architecture, and market forces.33  It further 
suggests augmenting these regulatory modalities with new approaches including public 
education, and the use of private institutions as regulators.  Part IV sets out conclusions 
and future directions for the development of online privacy principles.  While focused on 
digital video content, these observations will also have some application to other forms of 
online content including text files and email messages.34  Nevertheless, peer-based video 
privacy issues are a powerful and topical case study for putting more general online 
privacy concerns into sharp relief.   
 
II.  ONLINE VIDEO PRIVACY - GAPS IN THE EXISTING REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
 
In my mind and in my car, we can't rewind we've gone too far.  
Pictures came and broke your heart, put the blame on VTR. 
 
                                                 
28
  Katherine Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation:  A Theory of Willpower Norms, 57 
RUTGERS L REV 1235,1238 (2005) (“Social norms are primarily understood as means to coordinate the 
behavior of individuals in a social group. Thus, norms may help to solve coordination problems - by 
determining how pedestrians pass one another on the street - and collective action problems - by 
stigmatizing littering - when individually rational behavior leads to collectively undesirable results.”) 
29
  See discussion in Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:  The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
Through Technology, 76 TEXAS L REV 553 (1998) (describing how digital technology can be utilized as a 
form of regulatory mechanism for online conduct) (hereinafter, “Lex Informatica”). 
30
  Ann Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIFORNIA LAW REV 1231, 1253 (2001) (“Markets constrain 
behavior through price.  If the price of gasoline rises dramatically, people will drive less.”) 
31
  These may be defined as institutions with social benefits, rather than commercial profits, as their 
aim.  See Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEXAS L REV, forthcoming 2008 (describing the American 
Libraries Association as a regulatory institution in this sense with respect to the bill of rights it developed to 
protect interests of library patrons in 1939) (hereinafter, “Intellectual Privacy”). 
32
  LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK 
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY, 123 (2004) (noting that the four regulatory modalities he 
identifies must, of necessity, interact in practice) (hereinafter, “FREE CULTURE”). 
33
  Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND J ENT L & PRAC 56, 62-63 (1999) 
(hereinafter, “The Architecture of Privacy”); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:  What Cyberlaw 
Might Teach, 113 HARVARD LAW REV 501, 507 (1999) (identifying the four modalities of cyberspace 
regulation:  laws, norms, architecture, and markets) (hereinafter, “The Law of the Horse”); LESSIG, FREE 
CULTURE, supra note ___, at 121-123 (describing the four regulatory modalities and their need to interact 
to achieve effective regulation in cyberspace). 
34
  For a useful consideration of problems related to viral dissemination of emails, see James 
Grimmelman, Accidental Privacy Spills,  12 JOURNAL OF INTERNET LAW 3 (2008).   
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- The Buggles, “Video Killed the Radio Star”35 
 
Advances in video technologies have historically transformed societies in 
dramatic ways.  Well before The Buggles sang about the death of radio in the wake of 
early video tape-recording technology,36 late nineteenth century commentators expressed 
concerns about the development of the “snap camera” by Kodak.37  This was when 
photography first became relatively cheap and portable.38  It allowed private individuals 
and members of the press to take candid photographs in a manner never before possible.39  
It was also what ultimately spurred on Warren and Brandeis to publish their seminal 
article on privacy40 that would shape the development of American privacy law for more 
than a century.41   
 
The late 1890s was eerily similar to the present day in the sense that individuals 
now have a powerful new video capability at their fingertips.42  This time around, the 
technology enables us to take candid digital photographs without even having to 
remember to carry a camera.  The camera now exists in most people’s cellphones.  
Additionally, individuals do not require anything more than a network connection to 
disseminate those candid images to the world.  It is this unbridled distribution capacity 
that distinguishes our time from what has gone before.  It raises concerns that are not 
unlike those posed to copyright law in the digital age by the ability of individual 
consumers to share copyrighted works online on a scope and scale never before 
possible.43  As with online copyright piracy, the problems for online privacy revolve 
around: (a) the threat of viral online distribution of private images44 (“dissemination 
                                                 
35
  The Buggles, “Video Killed the Radio Star” (song lyrics), available at 
http://www.lyricsondemand.com/onehitwonders/videokilledtheradiostarlyrics.html , last viewed on May 
14, 2008. 
36
  id.  
37
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 107-108. 
38
  id, at 107 (“Kodak’s snap camera was cheap and portable.  Many more people could afford to own 
their own camera, and for the first time, candid photos of people could be taken.”) 
39
  Neil Richards and Daniel Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:  Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 
96 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 123, 128-9 (2007) (describing Warren and Brandeis’ concern with 
the combination of newspaper sensationalism and new photographic technology enabling more widescale 
candid photography and dissemination of resulting photographs than ever before) (hereinafter, “Privacy’s 
Other Path”); DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 15 (2008) (“Warren and Brandeis were 
concerned not only with new [photographic] technology but with how it would intersect with the media.  
The press was highly sensationalistic at the time.”) (hereinafter, “UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY”). 
40
  Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1980). 
41
  DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 15 (2008) (“Many scholars have proclaimed Warren 
and Brandeis’s article the foundation of privacy law in the United States.”); Richards and Solove, Privacy’s 
Other Path, supra note ___, at 127-8 (describing Warren and Brandeis’ contribution to the privacy debate 
as “Privacy’s Defining Moment” in heading “I”).  
42
  Sánchez Abril, supra note ___, at 11-12 (noting that almost 120 years after Warren and Brandeis 
published their article, history seems to be repeating itself in terms of a threat to privacy because of the rise 
in new communications technologies in cyberspace). 
43
  Raymond Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:  Napster and the New Economics of Digital 
Technology, 69 U CHI L REV 263 (2002) (identifying the ability of consumers to act as distributors as a 
significant change in the copyright paradigm). 
44
  With respect to the viral distribution of information online generally, see SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF 
REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 62 (“In the offline world, rarely does gossip hit a tipping point.  The 
process of spreading information to new people takes time, and friends often associate in similar circles, so 
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problems”); (b) the possibility of others augmenting the images with additional 
information (true, false, or indeterminate) (“aggregation problems”);45 and, (c) the 
inability of the complainant to ever obtain control of the information once it hits 
cyberspace (“permanence problems”).46  
 
A.  PROTECTING ONLINE PRIVACY:  GAPS IN THE CURRENT LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
1. Copyright Law 
 
Peer-based video privacy incursions involve images captured by friends and 
acquaintances and distributed online, either through closed or open social networks.  
Examples of closed networks are online social-networking services (“OSNs”) like 
Facebook and MySpace.  In these networks, users can control who has access to their 
online profiles.  Open networks, on the other hand, are generally accessible by anyone 
with an Internet connection.  A popular example of an open network in this context is 
YouTube.  It is important to note that, with respect to posted video content, control is 
currently generally in the hands of the holder of a given video file.  This person will not 
necessarily be the subject of the digital image.  This situation parallels the way in which 
the copyright system works with respect to photographs.  Initial copyright in a 
photograph is generally granted to the photographer, and not the subject of a 
photograph.47  Copyright law is thus not much help to those seeking to assert control over 
the dissemination of photographs in which they feature as subjects.  Of course, in the 
unusual case where the image subject is the owner of copyright in a given image, a 
copyright action would be possible for unauthorized distribution of the image online.48 
                                                                                                                                                 
most secrets don’t spread too widely.  The Internet takes this phenomenon and puts it on steroids.  People 
can communicate with tens of thousands – even millions – of people almost simultaneously.  If you put 
something up on the Internet, countless people can access it at the same time.  In an instant, information 
can speed across the globe.”) 
45
  The idea of data aggregation appears as a sub-set of the idea of information processing in 
Professor Solove’s “taxonomy of privacy”.  See, for example, SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra 
note ___, at 118 (“Aggregation is the gathering of information about a person.  A piece of information here 
or there is not very telling, but when combined, bits and pieces of data begin to form a portrait of a person.  
The whole becomes greater than the parts.”)  Adding new information to video images might, in some 
contexts, resemble a form of identification as also contemplated in Professor Solove’s taxonomy:  SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 123 (“Identification is similar to aggregation because both 
involve the combination of different pieces of information, one being the identity of a person.  However, 
identification differs from aggregation in that it entails a link to the person in the flesh.”)  
46
  McClurg, supra note ___, at 928 (“[P]ersons whose private information is posted on the Internet 
permanently lose control over that information and, hence, that aspect of their selves.”); SOLOVE, THE 
FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 33 (“The Internet … makes gossip a permanent reputational 
stain, one that never fades.  It is available around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in less 
than a second.”); ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211 (“Lives can be ruined after momentary wrongs, even if 
merely misdeameanors.”) 
47
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 184 (“Copyright in a photo is owned 
initially by the person who takes the photo, not by the person whose photo is taken.”) 
48
  17 U.S.C. § 106 sets out the rights of a copyright holder to prevent unauthorized reproduction, 
distribution, and preparation of derivative works based on a copyrighted work.  Additionally, where the 
image subject is a celebrity, and the image is exploited for commercial profit, a right of publicity action 
may be available: ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity 
REGULATING ONLINE PRIVACY 
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2. Tort Law – Privacy Torts 
 
Laws regulating intrusive photography are equally unlikely to be of much help to 
those concerned about the uploading and online dissemination of images in which they 
feature as subjects.  While there are some laws that prohibit intruding into another 
person’s private space to capture an image of that person,49 the OSN situation will 
generally not attract the operation of these laws.  Peer photographs are usually taken with 
the consent of the subject of the image.  In many cases, the subject has no objection to the 
taking of the picture, but may later be concerned about viral online dissemination of the 
photograph.  Laws that regulate intrusive image-capturing, while saying little about 
dissemination,50 are not much help to image subjects concerned about uncontrolled online 
distribution.  Other laws aimed at personal privacy will likewise have little to no 
application: for example, the idea of an unauthorized appropriation of a person’s name or 
likeness will be of little use in a peer context.51  For one thing, the appropriation is 
arguably not unauthorized if the image subject has consented to the taking of the 
photograph.  For another thing, this tort generally requires an unauthorized commercial 
profit motive52 which is generally absent in the context of an OSN.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
… is the right of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or 
other personal characteristics.”) (hereinafter, “GILSON ON TRADEMARKS”) 
49
  See, for example, California Civil Code, § 1708.8(a) (“A person is liable for physical invasion of 
privacy when the defendant knowingly enters onto the land of another person without permission or 
otherwise committed a trespass in order to physically invade the privacy of the plaintiff with the intent to 
capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in 
a personal or familial activity and the physical invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable 
person.”) 
50
  id, § 1708.8 (f) specifically states that dissemination of images taken in contravention of the 
earlier provisions of the section is not in and of itself a violation of the section:  “Sale, transmission, 
publication, broadcast, or use of any image or recording of the type, or under the circumstances, described 
in this section shall not itself constitute a violation of this section, nor shall this section be construed to 
limit all other rights or remedies of plaintiff in law or equity, including, but not 
limited to, the publication of private facts.” 
51
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 187 (“The appropriation tort would 
rarely apply to the discussion on the Internet of people’s private lives or the posting of their photos.”) 
52
  Appropriation actually appears as both a distinct limb of privacy law in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, and as a stand-alone tortious action in a number of American state jurisdictions known variously 
as the “right of publicity” or “personality rights tort”.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C (“One 
who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other 
for invasion of his privacy.”).  For an example of a right of publicity tort, see California Civil Code, § 
3344(a) (“Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any 
manner on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting 
purchases of products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case 
of a minor, the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by 
the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”).  Professor Solove notes that appropriation tort law in 
general has come to be viewed as protecting valuable property-like interests in an individual’s persona:  
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 187 (“The appropriation tort is often limited to 
instances in which a person’s identity is exploited for commercial gain.  The tort doesn’t apply when 
people’s names or likenesses are used in news, art, literature, and so on.”) 
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Other branches of privacy law in the United States focus respectively on public 
disclosure of private facts53 and on publicity which places a person in a false light in the 
eye of the public.54  Both of these require some form of public disclosure55 which may be 
missing in a closed social network such as Facebook or MySpace – although distribution 
over an open network such as YouTube would be another story.  However, even where 
there is a public disclosure, it is still an open question whether the distribution of candid 
photographs of friends and acquaintances will amount to disclosure of private facts, or 
will present a person in a false light.  An individual may well object to the dissemination 
of an image of her even though the image does not disclose any private facts about her, 
and does not present her in a false light for the purposes of the privacy torts.     
 
Can we gain any insights into appropriate regulatory avenues for video privacy by 
comparing OSNs to the physical world in which someone might take an unflattering or 
embarrassing photograph of a friend, and then show it to others?  The photographer has 
always presumably been free to show the picture to other friends or family members, and 
even to make copies and distribute them to other people.  Those other people may well 
show the photograph to people outside the immediate social network of the photographer 
and the photographic subject.  How is this different from what can happen online?  The 
answer lies in the scope and scale of the potential distribution, including accidental or 
incidental distributions to multiple closed and open networks.   
 
Additionally, there is the permanence problem.  Online images exhibit a 
permanence in multiple people’s hands simultaneously that is largely absent in the 
physical world.56  For a friend of a friend to attain a permanent copy of the original 
photograph, it is necessary for someone to go to the trouble of physically duplicating the 
photograph.  Online, however, the uploading of an image to Facebook gives multiple 
network participants instantaneous and simultaneous access in multiple geographic 
locations.57  The ability to copy and link the photograph to other websites at little to no 
cost increases the permanency problem.  The practical result of the permanency problem 
                                                 
53
  For a discussion of current problems and future directions with this branch of privacy law in the 
online context, see Sánchez Abril, supra note ___. 
54
  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the 
private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized 
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to 
the public.”) 
55
  id, § 652E (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before 
the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if  (a) the false light 
in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had 
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in 
which the other would be placed.”); Sánchez Abril, supra note ___, at 9-11 (discussing practical difficulties 
of individual plaintiffs establishing requisite disclosures of private facts both in the physical world and 
online). 
56
  McClurg, supra note ___, at 928 (“[P]ersons whose private information is posted on the Internet 
permanently lose control over that information and, hence, that aspect of their selves.”); SOLOVE, THE 
FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 33 (“The Internet … makes gossip a permanent reputational 
stain, one that never fades.  It is available around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in less 
than a second.”) 
57
  Grimmelmann, supra note ___, at 6 (making a similar comparison with contents of an email 
message as compared with a handwritten letter in the physical world; Grimmelmann notes that:  “People 
who wouldn’t have forwarded a letter will forward an email and they’ll forward it to more people.”)  
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is that, even if there is an effective regulatory method for an image subject to complain 
about online dissemination of an image, there will likely be no effective way to enforce 
an order to remove the image.  Another troubling corollary of this problem is that 
information accessible in multiple locations online is often devoid of the context that it 
would have in the physical world.58  This could lead to a greater incidence of 
embarrassing and unfair judgments about the subject of a photograph.59 
 
3. Tort Law – Defamation 
 
Obviously, the American privacy torts are of limited application in the OSN 
world.  Are there other regulatory alternatives?  It is possible that defamation law might 
be relevant in some cases.  However, an image would have to amount to a defamatory 
communication for a defamation action.  In many cases, an embarrassing or unflattering 
image will not be defamatory.  Further, defamation law can do little about viral 
distributions of personal images, or about the permanence problem.  Enforcement of a 
defamation order online can be problematic if the information in question exists in 
multiple websites and in multiple jurisdictions by the time the order is made.  
Additionally, internet intermediaries such as Internet service providers, who serve as 
conduits for potentially defamatory content – and are often the easiest potential 
defendants to identify – are generally immune from defamation suits online.60 
 
4. Data Protection Law in the European Union 
 
The European Union provides stronger data protection for its citizens than the 
United States under the auspices of the European Union Data Protection Directive (“the 
Data Protection Directive”)61.  However, there are some limitations to the reach of the 
Directive in the peer-based video context.  The first is that the Directive is generally 
limited to conduct occurring within the European Union.62  Thus, the Directive will not 
have global reach, subject to certain provisions that extend its operation to information of 
                                                 
58
  See, for example, discussion in McClurg, supra note ___, at 926-927 (troubling consequences of 
loss of context when information is removed from its original context and revealed widely to strangers); 
ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211 (problems of images being taken out of context online), 226-7 (describing 
issues arising from loss of context online and suggestions that hypertext protocols could be reconfigured to 
retain context by directing searches to original posting, rather than copies of the posting); 229-230 (loss of 
context can lead to blander information exchanges due to concerns about contextualization). 
59
  id., at 926-927 (troubling consequences of loss of context when information is removed from its 
original context and revealed widely to strangers), but see also ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 231 (“To be 
sure, contextualization addresses just one slice of the privacy problem, since it only adds information to a 
sensitive depiction.  If the depiction is embarrassing or humiliating, the opportunity to express that one is 
indeed embarrassed or humiliated does not much help.”) 
60
  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”).  See also 
discussion in SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 152-153. 
61
  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data. 
62
  Most of the articles of the Directive apply to Member States of the European Union.  However, 
some provisions impact on transfers of data to third countries:  See Data Protection Directive, Articles 25 
and 26.   
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its citizens transmitted to third countries.63  Perhaps more importantly, the Directive was 
drafted with the processing of text-based data in mind in the context of business or 
governmental dealings with personal information.  There may be some question about the 
extent to which its provisions would apply to video files distributed by peers on OSNs.  
While “personal data” is defined broadly in the Directive as:  “any information relating to 
an identified or identifiable natural person”,64 there are two important limitations.   
 
The first is that the Directive covers “information processing activities” which are 
conceived in terms that contemplate largely professional, governmental, or commercial 
activities involving compilations of individual information.  On the other hand, 
“processing” is defined broadly to encapsulate:  “any operation or set of operations which 
is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, 
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction”.65  Thus, it is possible that the broad 
definition of “personal data” could include digital video images and the broad definition 
of “processing” could include dissemination of those images over an OSN.   
 
However, the second limitation on the Directive’s operation may be more 
problematic.  Article 3(2) of the Directive excludes its application from the processing of 
personal data:  “by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household 
activity”.  Social networking activities might well fall within this category.  If that is the 
case, they would not be covered by the provisions of the Directive.  Of course, the 
Directive may apply to the OSNs that provide the forums for online networking, such as 
Facebook, MySpace, and Flickr.  These services are operating businesses and are not 
engaged in purely personal or household activities, even if their customers’ activities 
could be described in this way.  Thus, an aggrieved plaintiff may have an avenue of 
recourse against a social networking site, if not against specific peers who post 
unauthorized images on the service.66  Of course, enforcement of any order against an 
OSN service could still be problematic.  Presumably, the OSN could only remove copies 
of a relevant image existing on its own servers and not those that had been distributed 
outside.  Additionally, even finding all copies within the OSN’s own servers could be 
problematic unless the particular image was tagged in some way.67   
 
                                                 
63
  Data Protection Directive, Articles 25 & 26. 
64
  id., Article 2(a). 
65
  id., Article 2(b). 
66
  Of course, in the United States at least, there is a possibility that actions against online service 
providers relating to the posting of information by users of the service would fail because of the operation 
of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) which immunizes Internet intermediaries from suit with respect to the speech of 
others.   
67
  Sue Chastain, What is Tagging?  Using Keywords for Digital Photo Organization, ABOUT.COM:  
GRAPHICS SOFTWARE, available at http://graphicssoft.about.com/od/glossary/a/tagging.htm, last viewed on 
July 23, 2008 (“Tags are really nothing more than keywords used to describe a piece of data — be it a web 
page, a digital photo, or another type of digital document. Of course, organizing digital images by 
keywords and categories has been around for a long time, it just wasn't called "tagging" until fairly 
recently.”) 
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In any event, limitations on a complainant’s ability to bring actions against 
particular peers may be appropriate.  The ability for individuals to complain about 
privacy incursions amongst themselves may have two important advantages over 
complaints against online service providers.  The first is that it may help to develop social 
norms amongst online peers in terms of respecting each other’s privacy.  The second is 
that it would have less of a dramatic impact on online free speech and technological 
innovation than the ability to bring actions against online services providers.  
Commentators have expressed concerns in the past about over-broad use of intellectual 
property laws online.68  Their concerns are with both the potential chilling of expression69 
caused by overzealous enforcement of intellectual property rights online,70 as well as with 
the chilling of technological innovation that may ensue if innovators are too readily held 
liable for intellectual property infringements committed by their users.71  Actions against 
innovators in social networking technologies may have a more adverse impact on online 
communications overall than actions involving only private individuals.72   
 
With respect to free speech concerns, there are good arguments that the current 
balance between free speech and privacy rights online is weighted too heavily against 
privacy.73  Particularly in the context of content created by private individuals about 
private individuals intended for closed social networks, it is arguable that calls for free 
speech are less powerful than in some other contexts.  There is little suggestion that 
society will be harmed if individual privacy is better protected over OSNs.74  This may be 
                                                 
68
  See, for example, Jacqueline Lipton, Commerce Versus Commentary:  Gripe Sites, Parody, and 
the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 84 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1327 (2006) (arguing 
against the overpropertization of domain names through unbridled application of trademark law); Margreth 
Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment:  Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 
CONN L REV 973 (2007) (discussing the need to balance free speech with trademark interests in the domain 
space); Todd Hartman, The Marketplace vs. The Ideas:  The First Amendment Challenges to Internet 
Commerce, 12 HARV J LAW AND TECH 419 (1999); Neil Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our 
System of Free Expression, 53 VAND L REV 1879 (2000); Jack Balkin, A Theory of Freedom of Expression 
for the Information Society, 79 NYU L REV 1 (2004). 
69
  id. 
70
  id.; LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___. 
71
  See, for example, Alfred Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W 
RES 815, 817-8 (2005) (“If technology providers become responsible for their users’ misbehavior, they will 
stop developing and creating for fear of liability, and this will ultimately rob society of the many benefits 
that technology brings.”). 
72
  Congress has recognized this in the case of liability for online defamation and some liability for 
online copyright infringement by creating legislative “safe harbors” for intermediary Internet service 
providers against liability of their customers for relevant infringements:  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”); 17 U.S.C. § 512 (safe harbor for Internet 
service providers against contributory copyright infringement in particular listed circumstances). 
73
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 89 (“The interests aligned against privacy 
– for example, efficient consumer transactions, free speech, or security – are often defined in terms of their 
larger social value.  In this way, protecting the privacy of the individual seems extravagant when weighed 
against the interests of society as a whole.”)  In fact, arguments have been made that protecting privacy 
might actually further some of the same interests that free speech protects:  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF 
REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 129-132.   
74
  Daniel Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN 
DIEGO LAW REVIEW 745, 760-764 (2007) (critiquing conceptions of privacy that pit privacy against free 
speech, and noting that society benefits when the value of privacy is not conceptualized within this 
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contrasted with situations where a digital image relates to a matter that is actually of 
public interest or concern, such as may be the case with an image of a public official in a 
comprising situation.   
 
One example of where privacy harms may outweigh free speech concerns in 
practice is that relating to a young Canadian student who became known as “Star Wars 
Kid” online.75  An embarrassing video file of him playing with a golf ball retriever as if it 
was a light saber from the “Star Wars” movies found its way online76 and was 
transformed by many Internet users in various ways.77  There may be a free speech 
argument that supports this conduct,78 although one might question whether the free 
speech advocates for this kind of conduct think the cost justifies the end results.  The 
young student ended up in psychiatric care for psychological damage related to his online 
embarrassment.79  Thus, those who support the status quo, and oppose strengthening 
online privacy principles in the name of free speech, should think seriously about the 
conduct that can take place over open networks to humiliate and embarrass members of 
the very societies whose rights they seek to protect.  Indeed, some commentators have 
argued that posting personal information about one’s friends and acquaintances is 
unlikely to advance free speech interests in many cases.80   
 
Again, these views may support developing privacy regulations that operate 
between peers online, rather than impacting online service providers.  Perhaps the 
obligation should be on peers to respect each other’s privacy online, and regulations 
                                                                                                                                                 
paradigm because individual privacy rights generally bow down before issues perceived as greater social 
goods such as free speech under this conception of the free speech versus privacy balance) (hereinafter, 
“Nothing to Hide”). 
75
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 44-48. 
76
  id, at 44-45. 
77
  id, at 46-48. 
78
  Sánchez Abril, supra note __, at 29-32 (discussing problems of balancing First Amendment 
interests with the public disclosure of private facts tort in the online social networks context). 
79
  Wired News Report, Star Wars Kid Files Lawsuit, July 24, 2003, WIRED, available at 
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2003/07/59757, last viewed on July 23, 2008 (“Ghyslain was 
so teased about the video, he dropped out of school and finished the semester at a children's psychiatric 
ward, according to a lawsuit filed in the Raza's hometown of Trois-Rivières, Quebec.”); ZITTRAIN, supra 
note ___, at 212 (“The student who made the [Star Wars kid] video has been reported to have been 
traumatized by its circulation…”).  Similar ill fate befell “dog poop girl” in that she was apparently forced 
to quit her job as a result of the barrage of online harrassment about the incident involving her dog pooping 
on the subway train:  ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211.  An even more unpleasant fate befell a Hong Kong 
bus passenger who later became known on the Internet as “Bus Uncle”:  ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 211 
(“The famed “Bus Uncle” of Hong Kong upbraided a fellow bus passenger who politely asked him to speak 
more quietly on his mobile phone.  The mobile phone user learned an important lesson in etiquette when a 
third person captured the argument and then uploaded it to the Internet, where 1.3 milllion people have 
viewed on version of the exchange …. Weeks after the video was posted, the Bus Uncle was beaten up in a 
targeted attack at the restaurant where he worked.”) 
80
  McClurg, supra note ___, at 928-9 (“[L]ittle justification or sociality utility exists in posting 
private information about an intimate partner or former partner on the Internet without the person’s 
consent.  Such information seldom will advance any core interest of free speech, yet can substantially 
jeopardize emotional, and even physical, security.”)  Of course, Professor McClurg was limiting his 
comments to intimate partner’s in romantic relationships, but this principle holds true more generally with 
respect to friends and acquaintances. 
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should enforce these norms, rather than inhibiting the development of technologies that 
foster communication, such as OSNs.  At least, there should be a balance between 
regulations that directly impact OSNs and those that operate between online peers.  
Remember, here, that the term “regulation” is being used broadly in this article to 
encompass laws, norms, market forces, system architecture, educational initiatives, and 
private institutions. 
 
It is also important to acknowledge that advocating more individual privacy 
protection online is not necessarily advocating absolute protection to the extent that 
speech and communication are impossible.  Rather, it is suggesting the development of 
some principles that would ensure that a video subject has some say in the dissemination 
of digital images in situations where it is reasonable to expect that the individual should 
be able to assert some control.  Would this create a legal property right in a person’s 
image?81  Not necessarily.  It would depend on how the control mechanism was framed.  
In particular, it would depend on the interplay between the various regulatory modalities 
identified above.  Property rights are largely the creature of laws82 and markets,83 whereas 
norms and other regulatory modalities may not rely so heavily on notions of property. 
 
B.  LIMITATIONS OF CONTRACTUAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
 
Another current possibility for regulating online video privacy might be derived 
from the terms of use of OSNs and other online networks over which images may be 
disseminated.  However, as with legal regulation, there are serious gaps and problems in 
relying on the current state of these terms of use.  OSNs vary in the extent to which they 
impose terms on their users to respect others’ privacy.  Online services such as YouTube 
and Flickr, for example, allow large scale public dissemination of video information with 
little attempt at confidentiality.  The operators of these services exercise some control 
over contents,84 but rely heavily on their users to self-police.85  Yahoo’s terms of use, for 
                                                 
81
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 24-29 (critiquing property theory of 
privacy rights). 
82
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 520 (“The government could declare that 
information about individuals obtained through a computer network is owned by the individuals; others 
could take that information, and use it, only with the consent of those individuals.”) 
83
  See, for example, Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 393, 397 
(1978) (“That disclosure of personal information is resisted by, i.e., is costly to, the person to whom the 
information pertains yet is valuable to others may seem to argue for giving people property rights in 
information about themselves and letting them sell those rights freely.  The process of voluntary exchange 
would then assure that the information was put to its most valuable use.”) 
84
  See, for example, clause 7.B. of YouTube’s Terms of Use:  “YouTube reserves the right to decide 
whether Content or a User Submission is appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for 
violations other than copyright infringement, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or 
defamatory material, or excessive length. YouTube may remove such User Submissions and/or terminate a 
User's access for uploading such material in violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior 
notice and at its sole discretion.” (available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed on May 14, 2008).  
However, note that some commentators have suggested that many of these policies are not actually 
enforced in practice:  Sánchez Abril, supra note ___, at 14, fn 84 (noting that there is little to no apparent 
enforcement of MySpace’s terms of use as an example of lack of effective policing by online social 
network services providers). 
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example, which are expressly incorporated into agreements to use Flickr, provide that 
each subscriber agrees not to use the online service to:  “upload, post, email, transmit or 
otherwise make available any Content that is unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, 
harassing, tortious, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, libelous, invasive of another's privacy, 
hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable”.86  YouTube’s Terms of Use 
provide that:  “In connection with User Submissions, you … agree that you will not 
submit material that is copyrighted, protected by trade secret or otherwise subject to third 
party proprietary rights, including privacy and publicity rights, unless you are the owner 
of such rights or have permission from their rightful owner to post the material ….”.87   
 
Some closed networks such as Facebook incorporate more strongly worded 
privacy protections into their terms of use.  Not only does Facebook include a clause very 
similar to the above terms from the Yahoo and YouTube terms of use,88 it also requests 
that its subscribers not use the service to:  “upload, post, transmit, share, store or 
otherwise make available any videos other than those of a personal nature that: (i) are of 
you or your friends, (ii) are taken by you or your friends, or (iii) are original art or 
animation created by you or your friends.”89  Facebook also provides its users with a set 
of Privacy Principles organized around two “core principles”, the second of which states 
that:  “There is an increasing amount of information available out there, and you may 
want to know what relates to you, your friends, and people around you. We want to help 
you easily get that information.”90  Additionally, Facebook’s terms of use provide that:  
“You may not post, transmit, or share User Content on the Site or Service that you did 
not create or that you do not have permission to post.”91 
 
One limitation of these principles and policies is the extent to which they are 
legally enforceable.  Even if these provisions do effectively become part of a user’s 
contract with a relevant network,92 the actual complainant about a privacy incursion is not 
a party to that contract.  Thus, the victim of a privacy breach may not have standing to 
bring an action under the OSN’s terms of use.  Further, there is a definitional question as 
                                                                                                                                                 
85
  See, for example, clause 6 of Yahoo’s Terms of Use relating to “Member Conduct”, available at 
info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html, last viewed on May 14, 2008; clause 6 of YouTube’s 
Terms of Use relating to “User Submissions and Conduct”, available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last 
viewed on May 14, 2008. 
86
  Yahoo’s Terms of Use, clause 6(a), available at info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-
173.html, last viewed on May 14, 2008 (emphasis added). 
87
  YouTube’s Terms of Use, clause 6.D., available at  http://youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed on 
May 14, 2008 (emphasis added). 
88
  Facebook’s Terms of Use, “User Conduct” clause, available at 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008. 
89
  id.  See also Facebook’s Code of Conduct, available at 
http://www.facebook.com/codeofconduct.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008. 
90
  Facebook Principles, available at http://www.facebook.com/policy.php, last viewed on May 14, 
2008. 
91
  Facebook Terms of Use, Clause on “User Content Posted on the Site”, available at 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008. 
92
  For example, if the terms are presented in a manner where the user has to affirmatively assent to 
be bound by the terms, and if some meaningful consideration can be found to support the contract:  Specht 
v Netscape Communications Corp, 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 306 F. 3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(describing application of these contract law principles to online contractin). 
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to how to interpret a clause providing that a subscriber will not engage in conduct that is 
invasive of another person’s privacy.  There is no clear legal definition of conduct that is 
invasive of another’s privacy in this context.  Thus, any interpretation of such a clause 
would have to fall back on social norms.   
 
This is not an insurmountable problem, but it does suggest that social norms will 
play a central role in resolving these kinds of disputes in the future: for example, one 
might argue that clauses prohibiting conduct that is “unlawful or invasive of another’s 
privacy” suggest that the reference to privacy infringement is outside of, and separate 
from, purely legal conceptions of privacy.  Otherwise, the policies would be drafted 
differently.  If privacy within the policies was intended to connote purely legal privacy 
rights, arguably the policy would say something like:  “users will not upload or transmit 
content that is unlawful in any way, including content that infringes another person’s 
privacy rights”.  Juxtaposing privacy invasions with legal rights in the way that some 
current clauses are drafted could be regarded as a contractual attempt to enforce both 
legal rights and social norms relating to privacy. 
 
With respect to clauses such as Facebook’s requirement that a subscriber must 
only post material that she created or had permission to post, there is no definition of 
what constitutes “permission to post”.  In particular, there is no guidance as to whose 
permission must be obtained for the posting of what information: for example, if I take a 
group photograph of my high school class, do I have to obtain the whole classes’ 
permission to post the photograph?  What form does that permission have to take?  If I 
simply ask my classmates at the time of taking the photo whether anyone minds if I post 
the photo on my Facebook page, and no one expressly objects, would that constitute 
permission?  What if I take a photograph or video in a crowded mall that includes people 
I know and people I don’t know?  Do I need to obtain permission from all the 
photographic subjects to post the photograph online?  What if I take a video of two otters 
swimming side by side – for some reason a popular YouTube contribution.93  Whose 
permission do I need, if any, to show this video online?  The zookeeper’s?  Any 
bystanders who may appear in the picture?  What if one of the bystanders is doing 
something embarrassing, such as picking her nose or adjusting her underwear?  What if 
one of the bystanders is kissing or holding hands with a homosexual partner, and it turns 
out that the person is not openly gay?  Do I owe any greater concern for their privacy 
because of the potential discomfort, embarrassment or harm it might cause them to have 
people see this conduct online?   
 
With respect to the “permission to post” requirement, it is likely that the drafting 
intention behind this clause was to capture permission of those with proprietary interests 
in relevant content, such as copyrights or trademarks.  It seems perfectly reasonable to 
require me to obtain copyright permission to post something, like a movie clip, that might 
otherwise infringe copyright.  However, privacy rights work differently – if at all – in this 
                                                 
93
  YouTube, “Otters Holding Hands” (available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=epUk3T2Kfno, last viewed on July 23, 2008). 
REGULATING ONLINE PRIVACY 
  18 
context.  Some commentators have suggested that privacy should be treated as an 
intangible property right of some kind,94 but there is little consensus on this point.95   
 
YouTube’s “permission to post” requirement is more closely linked to the concept 
of privacy rights than Facebook’s requirement.  YouTube requires that users agree not to 
submit any material that is subject to third party proprietary rights “including privacy and 
publicity rights” unless the user owns the relevant rights or has permission from the 
rights-holder to post the material.96  Here, a privacy right is included in the concept of a 
property right.  As noted above, this may or may not be a legally accurate conception of 
privacy.  The privacy right is also linked with the notion of publicity rights in the 
YouTube clause.  Publicity rights generally are treated as property rights, even though 
this theoretical justification for the rights has been criticized.97  The linkage between 
privacy and publicity rights is a historical one. Publicity rights are generally regarded as 
having been born out of gaps left by the Warren and Brandeis conception of privacy98 as 
applied to celebrities and public figures.  Celebrities and public figures had a difficult 
                                                 
94
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note __, at 24-29 (critiquing property based theories of 
privacy); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 Stan L Rev 1283, 1288-1294 
(2000) (describing various theories of private information as property). 
95
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 27 (“Extending property concepts to 
personal information … has difficulties.  Information can be easily transmitted and, once known by others, 
cannot be eradicated from their minds.  Unlike physical objects, information can be possessed 
simultaneously within the minds of millions.  This is why intellectual-property law protects particular 
tangible expressions of ideas rather than the underlying ideas themselves.  The complexity of personal 
information is that it is both an expression of the self and a set of facts – a historical record of one’s 
behavior.”); Litman, supra note ___, at 1294-1295 (“Whether or not it could be easily implemented, a 
privacy-as-property solution carries with it some serious disadvantages. Our society has a longstanding 
commitment to freedom of expression. Property rights in any sort of information raise significant policy 
and free speech issues. Facts are basic building blocks: building blocks of expression; of self-government; 
and of knowledge itself. When we recognize property rights in facts, we endorse the idea that facts may be 
privately owned and that the owner of a fact is entitled to restrict the uses to which that fact may be put. 
That notion is radical. It is also inconsistent with much of our current First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Thus, the idea of creating property rights in personal data raises fundamental constitutional issues. If it 
looked likely that a property rights model would prove to be an effective tool for protecting personal data 
privacy, it might be worthwhile to balance the privacy and free speech interests to see which one weighed 
more. [H]owever, a property rights model would be ineffective in protecting data privacy. It would, in all 
likelihood, make the problem worse.”); Posner, supra note ___, at 397-401 (critiquing theories that favour 
personal property rights in private information).    
96
  Clause 6.D., YouTube’s Terms of Use (available at http://www.youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed 
on July 23, 2008). 
97
  See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace:  A Personality Rights Paradigm for 
Personal Domain Name Disputes, WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW, forthcoming, 2008. 
98
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 15 (“In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis penned their famous article, “The Right to Privacy,” arguing for the legal recognition of a right to 
privacy, which they defined as a “right to be let alone.”)  It should be noted that the Warren and Brandeis 
conception of privacy actually drew from previous work by Thomas Cooley:  Ruth Gavison, Privacy and 
the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE LAW JOURNAL 421, 437, and n.48 (1980) (noting that the concept of privacy 
as the “right to be let alone” is often incorrectly attributed to Warren and Brandeis, when it was actually 
first advanced by Cooley in T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed 1888); see also Diane Zimmerman, 
Requiem for a Heavyweight:  A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L REV 291, 
292 and n.2 (1983). 
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time convincing courts that defendants had intruded into their seclusion and infringed on 
their “right to be let alone”, having actively sought the public eye for their livelihoods.99   
 
Publicity rights were born to guard against unauthorized commercial exploitations 
of celebrities’ names and likenesses.100  The continuing linkage between privacy and 
publicity rights potentially connotes a property right in both contexts.  Therefore, the 
drafting of YouTube’s “permission to post” clause is problematic in that it implicitly 
requires a property right in private information as the basis for a complaint.  As noted in 
the preceding paragraphs, it is not universally accepted that individuals have property 
rights in their own personal information.101  Even those who think that individuals do – or 
should – own their personal information online have generally considered this question 
with respect to text-based data, rather than visual images.102   
 
Images are qualitatively different in that they contain both more, and less, 
information about an individual.  They capture something candid about the individual at a 
given moment in time.103  Text-based data on the other hand, is iterative.  The concerns 
about use of text-based data online have been about the way in which it can be 
                                                 
99
  GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1][a] (explaining the derivation of the right of 
publicity from the original Warren and Brandeis privacy conception, noting in particular that celebrities 
often did not suffer the same damages as private individuals with respect to commercial appropriations of 
their images, having sought public attention themselves; celebrities, rather, wanted to be financially 
compensated for unauthorized commercial profits made from their personas). 
100
  id. (explaining the derivation of the right of publicity from the original Warren and Brandeis 
privacy conception, noting in particular that celebrities often did not suffer the same damages as private 
individuals with respect to commercial appropriations of their images, having sought public attention 
themselves; celebrities, rather, wanted to be financially compensated for unauthorized commercial profits 
made from their personas). 
101
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 27 (“Extending property concepts to 
personal information … has difficulties.  Information can be easily transmitted and, once known by others, 
cannot be eradicated from their minds.  Unlike physical objects, information can be possessed 
simultaneously within the minds of millions.  This is why intellectual-property law protects particular 
tangible expressions of ideas rather than the underlying ideas themselves.  The complexity of personal 
information is that it is both an expression of the self and a set of facts – a historical record of one’s 
behavior.”); Litman, supra note ___, at 1294-1295 (“Whether or not it could be easily implemented, a 
privacy-as-property solution carries with it some serious disadvantages. Our society has a longstanding 
commitment to freedom of expression. Property rights in any sort of information raise significant policy 
and free speech issues. Facts are basic building blocks: building blocks of expression; of self-government; 
and of knowledge itself. When we recognize property rights in facts, we endorse the idea that facts may be 
privately owned and that the owner of a fact is entitled to restrict the uses to which that fact may be put. 
That notion is radical. It is also inconsistent with much of our current First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Thus, the idea of creating property rights in personal data raises fundamental constitutional issues. If it 
looked likely that a property rights model would prove to be an effective tool for protecting personal data 
privacy, it might be worthwhile to balance the privacy and free speech interests to see which one weighed 
more. [H]owever, a property rights model would be ineffective in protecting data privacy. It would, in all 
likelihood, make the problem worse.”); Posner, supra note ___, at 397-401 (critiquing theories that favour 
personal property rights in private information).    
102
  See, for example, discussion in Ann Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves:  Privacy, Propertization, and 
Gender, 34 USF L REV 633 (2000); Litman, supra note ___. 
103
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 165 (citing Professor McClurg’s work 
suggesting that images have a quality of permanence that memories lack in the sense that people can 
scrutinize an image and notice details they might not see when observing the original situation). 
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aggregated over a period of time to build up a detailed profile of a person.104  It may take 
a whole collection of text-based data to suggest something that a picture candidly 
demonstrates in one digital file: for example, an aggregated text-based profile may 
include elements that suggest a person is trying to become pregnant.  These records may 
include purchasing records and medical records involving purchase of ovulation tests, 
pregnancy tests, information on pregnancy, information on in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), 
and medical appointments with fertility specialists.  However, a video image of the 
person entering an IVF clinic could tell the story in one glance.   
 
Peer-based images are also qualitatively different from text in that they are likely 
to arise out of a relationship between the image subject and the photographer.  This may 
suggest that both parties have rights to information contained in the image because they 
were both parties to a shared experience that led to the taking of the photograph.  For 
example, a photograph at a given social event is a record of a shared experience between 
the photographer and the photographic subject.  When information arises from 
relationships, and implicates joint interests in control of the information, the regulation of 
the dissemination of that information is more problematic than in situations where 
information purely pertains to one individual.105  Of course, one could argue that much 
online text-based information also arises from a relationship – that of the relationship 
between the data subject and the organization with which the subject transacted.  
However, the information in the text-based data aggregation context is more likely to 
consist of discrete facts pertaining to the data subject106 than the information contained in 
a photograph of a shared experience between two peers.   
 
This discussion has so far not touched upon the question of the standing of a 
photographic or video subject to bring a complaint under an OSN’s terms of use.  Even if 
that person can establish a sufficient legal interest in her image to satisfy the “permission 
to post” aspect of, say, YouTube’s terms of use, her recourse would be to complain to 
YouTube that the subscriber had infringed her rights.  It would be up to YouTube to 
decide whether the complaint had any merit, and whether to take any commensurate 
action against the subscriber, such as removing the posting, or barring the subscriber 
from the system.107 
 
There are further limitations with relying on OSNs’ terms of use to protect 
privacy.  Even Facebook’s requirement that users limit their postings to photographs of 
themselves and their friends, or photographs taken by themselves or their friends, is open 
to interpretation.  On a closed network like Facebook, the term “friends” means 
                                                 
104
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 117-121.  
105
  id., supra note ___, at 27 (“Personal information is often formed in relationships with others.  All 
parties to that relationship have some claim to the information.”) 
106
  For example, the person’s name, address, telephone number, or Social Security Number. 
107
  See, for example, YouTube’s Terms of Use, Clause 7.B. (“YouTube reserves the right to decide 
whether Content or a User Submission is appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for 
violations other than copyright infringement, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or 
defamatory material, or excessive length. YouTube may remove such User Submissions and/or terminate a 
User's access for uploading such material in violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior 
notice and at its sole discretion.”), available at http://youtube.com/t/terms, last viewed on May 14, 2008. 
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something qualitatively different to the way in which we conceptualize a friend in the 
physical world.108  In the physical world, we know whether or not we are acquainted with 
a particular person.  We may or may not know the person well, and we may even have 
forgotten the person’s name.  However, we are unlikely to consider someone a friend or 
acquaintance if we have never met them.   
 
This is quite different online.  A “friend” on Facebook is anyone who has given 
you permission to join their online network of “friends”, whether or not they have ever 
met you in person.109  Although Facebook contemplates that its subscribers will use the 
service to find people online who they already know in the real world,110 there is no way 
to ensure that this is the case in practice.  It is easy to make relatively anonymous online 
contacts on Facebook, and for those contacts to quickly be considered “friends”.  These 
contacts will increase the potential recipients of information on a subscriber’s site to 
many people who the subscriber, and the subject of any information on the subscriber’s 
website, may not actually know.  Of course, the practical problems can potentially be 
greater on an open network that does not even attempt to limit dissemination of 
information to online “friends”.  However, the point here is that “friends” in a closed 
network’s terms of use may be a deceptively comforting concept for those concerned 
about online privacy.   
 
III.  SIX MODALITIES FOR VIDEO PRIVACY REGULATION 
 
The problem of protecting privacy in cyberspace comes in part from an architecture that 
enables the collection of data without the user's consent. But the problem also comes 
from a background regime of entitlement that does not demand that the collector obtain 
the user's consent. Because the user has no property interest in personal information, 
information about the user is free for the taking. 
 
- Professor Lawrence Lessig111 
 
A.  PROFESSOR LESSIG’S FOUR MODALITIES OF CYBERSPACE REGULATION 
 
Like all new advances in communications technology, the rise of peer-based 
digital imaging capability creates new challenges for our regulatory system.  Like most 
                                                 
108
  ZITTRAIN, supra note ___, at 218 (noting that a person’s “friends” network online includes their 
“friends’ friends’ friends.”) 
109
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 202 (noting that technologies like 
Facebook require a binary definition of the term “friend” – a “friend” is permitted access to your 
information while a non-friend is not - while a social network in the real world is much more complex). 
110
  For example, Facebook’s information on finding friends online states that:  “Your friends on 
Facebook are the same friends, acquaintances and family members that you communicate with in the real 
world.” (available at https://register.facebook.com/findfriends.php?ref_friends, last viewed on May 14, 
2008).  Facebook also prohibits the use of aliases online so that people who think they are being contacted 
by someone they actually know are really being contacted by that person:  for example, the User Conduct 
clause of Facebook’s Terms of Use prohibits impersonating any person, falsely representing yourself, and 
creating a false identity (available at http://www.facebook.com/terms.php, last viewed on May 14, 2008). 
111
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 520. 
REGULATING ONLINE PRIVACY 
  22 
digital age advances, these challenges are global in nature.  As with cyberlaw more 
generally, we need to consider whether we are confronting the need for new regulatory 
approaches, or rather of simply expanding the application of current regulatory structures.  
In this context, it is important to appreciate that there is more than one possible regulatory 
modality for online conduct.  Legal rules are not the only solution. 112   
 
In the early days of Internet governance debates, Professor Lawrence Lessig 
recognized four distinct regulatory modalities that would be useful in cyberspace.113  They 
included legal rules, which Professor Lessig defined as rules that constrain our behavior 
by threatening punishment if we do not obey.114  He then identified three other forms of 
regulation that are found in real space and that may be applied in cyberspace:  social 
norms,
115
 markets,116 and architecture.117  Social norms are similar to legal rules in that they 
threaten punishment for disobedience.118  However, they differ in that the punishment is 
imposed by community, rather than government.119  Markets regulate by imposing price 
constraints on certain behaviors.120  In the privacy context in particular, Professor Lessig 
noted that one example of market forces as regulator is where firms are able to charge 
more to consumers if they provide greater assurances of personal privacy.121  Architecture 
regulates by physically constraining certain types of behavior.122  In the real world, for 
example, the erection of a border fence may constrain illegal immigration.123  The 
                                                 
112
  id., at 507-510.  
113
  id; Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, supra note ___, at 62-63. 
114
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra, note ___, at 507 (“Law … orders people to behave in certain 
ways; it threatens punishment if they do not obey.  The law tells me not to buy certain drugs, not to sell 
cigarettes without a license, and not to trade across international borders without first filing a customs form. 
It promises strict punishments if these orders are not followed. In this way, we say that law regulates.”) 
115
  id. (“Norms control where I can smoke; they affect how I behave with members of the opposite 
sex; they limit what I may wear; they influence whether I will pay my taxes. Like law, norms regulate by 
threatening punishment ex post. But unlike law, the punishments of norms are not centralized. Norms are 
enforced (if at all) by a community, not by a government. In this way, norms constrain, and therefore 
regulate.”) 
116
  id. (“Markets, too, regulate. They regulate by price. The price of gasoline limits the amount one 
drives - more so in Europe than in the United States. The price of subway tickets affects the use of public 
transportation - more so in Europe than in the United States.”) 
117
  id., at 507-509 (“[T]here is a fourth feature of real space that regulates behavior - "architecture." 
By "architecture" I mean the physical world as we find it, even if "as we find it" is simply how it has 
already been made. That a highway divides two neighborhoods limits the extent to which the 
neighborhoods integrate. That a town has a square, easily accessible with a diversity of shops, increases the 
integration of residents in that town. That Paris has large boulevards limits the ability of revolutionaries to 
protest.  That the Constitutional Court in Germany is in Karlsruhe, while the capital is in Berlin, limits the 
influence of one branch of government over the other. These constraints function in a way that shapes 
behavior. In this way, they too regulate.”) 
118
  id, at 507. 
119
  id. 
120
  id. 
121
  Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, supra note ___, at 62. 
122
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 507-508. 
123
  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 98-99 (giving examples of ways in which 
physical architectures can constrain behavior); LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 122 (“A fallen 
bridge might constrain your ability to get across a river.  Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a 
community to integrate its social life.  As with the market, architecture does not effect its constraint through 
ex post punishments.  Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects its constraint through 
simultaneous conditions.”) 
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cyberspace analog to physical world architecture is system architecture or “code”.124  
According to Professor Lessig, this encompasses both the hardware and software aspects 
of an information technology system.125  In the privacy context, Professor Lessig has 
suggested that encryption technology is an example of system architecture that could 
some way towards protecting online privacy.126 
 
Professor Lessig further observed that none of the four modalities of regulation 
operates in a vacuum.  They all rely on each other to some extent.127  It is the interaction 
of the regulatory modalities that facilitates a given behavior in both direct and indirect 
ways.128  Professor Lessig’s account of regulatory modalities is very apt when one 
considers the regulation of digital video privacy amongst peer networks.  No one 
modality effectively protects individual privacy in video images to the extent we might 
desire.  Even the current interplay between these modalities arguably does not achieve 
that result.  This article argues that we could more effectively identify and develop 
aspects of these, and other, regulatory modalities, as well as potential interactions 
between them, in ways that might better protect privacy online.  In this context, it 
suggests the recognition of two additional regulatory modalities in the OSN context:  (a) 
public education,129 and, (d) private institutions.130  Private institutions might comprise 
OSNs themselves, but perhaps more to the point, public interest organizations like the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation131 (“EFF”) and the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(“EPIC”).132  The identification of new forms of regulatory modality is not inconsistent 
                                                 
124
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 509 (“[T]he architecture of cyberspace, or its 
code, regulates behavior in cyberspace. The code, or the software and hardware that make cyberspace the 
way it is, constitutes a set of constraints on how one can behave.”) 
125
  id., at 509. 
126
  Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, supra note ___, at 63. 
127
  LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra, note ___, at 123 (“[T]he first point about these four modalities of 
regulation is obvious:  They interact.  Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced by another.  Or 
restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by another.”).  See also A Michael Froomkin, The Death 
of Privacy?, 52 STAN L REV 1461, 1466 (2000) (“While there may be no single tactic that suffices to 
preserve the status quo, much less regain lost privacy, a smorgasbord of creative technical and legal 
approaches could make a meaningful stand against what otherwise seems inevitable.”) 
128
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 511-534; Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 
supra note ___, at 63-64 (suggesting a combined arhictecture/market solution to protecting privacy online, 
that relies in part on use of the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) designed by the World Wide Web 
Consortium). 
129
  Lilian Edwards and Ian Brown, Data Control and Social Networking:  Irreconcilable Ideas?, at 
___  in ANDREA M MATWYSHYN (ed), HARBORING DATA:  INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW AND THE 
CORPORATION, forthcoming, 2008; SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 203-204. 
130
  Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note ___, at 33 (discussing the American Libraries 
Association’s role of protecting patron’s rights and freedoms in the library bill of rights in 1939 as an 
example of an institution playing a regulatory role in promoting individual privacy).   
131
  The Electronic Frontier Foundation describes itself as:  “leading civil liberties group defending 
your rights in the digital world.” (see www.eff.org, last viewed on July 23, 2008). 
132
  The Electronic Privacy Information Center describes itself as:  “a public interest research center in 
Washington, D.C. It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and 
to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values.” (see www.epic.org, last viewed on July 
23, 2008). 
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with Professor Lessig’s work – he did not intend for his four regulatory modalities to be 
the last word on cyberspace regulation.133   
 
The remainder of this Part identifies the key features of each of these six 
regulatory modalities and how they might be usefully applied in practice to create more 
effective protections for online privacy.  In so doing, it necessarily considers the potential 
interactions between the six modalities, as it is unlikely that any one or more of these 
modes of regulation, operating alone, could achieve an appropriate balance of interests 
involving video privacy.134  Before turning to the individual modes of regulation, it is 
worth first touching on the necessity of characterizing a video privacy right as either a 
form of property right or something else.  As some of the regulatory modalities identified 
here, such as market forces, are often regarded as necessitating property interests for the 
efficient operation of markets,135 it is important to establish the contours of video privacy 
rights in terms of whether or not that are, or need be, classified as a form of property. 
 
B.  PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION? 
 
One issue that has plagued privacy law has been uncertainty about whether 
individuals have – or should have – a property right in their personal information.136  If 
such a property right is to be recognized, what form should it take?  Some commentators 
have assumed that, absent a governmentally recognized property right in personal 
information, there is scant policy justification for enacting new laws to protect online 
privacy.137  Professor Lessig, for example, has argued that the creation of a property right 
in personal information would be a matter for government.138  Once governmentally 
established, the right would be instrumental in regulating unauthorized uses of personal 
information in terms of familiar civil and criminal law concepts such as misappropriation 
                                                 
133
  LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 123 (“Whether or not there are other constraints (there 
may well be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most significant…”). 
134
  Balancing of competing interests is a central part of developing a useful approach to privacy:  
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 87 (“We live in an “age of balancing,” and the 
prevailing view is that most rights and liberties are not absolute.  Because privacy conflicts with other 
fundamental values, such as free speech, security, curiosity, and transparency, we should engage in a 
candid and direct analysis of why privacy interests are important and how they ought to be reconciled with 
other interests.  We cannot ascribe a value to privacy in the abstract.”)    
135
  See, for example, discussion in Posner, supra note ___, at 397 (“That disclosure of personal 
information is resisted by, i.e., is costly to, the person to whom the information pertains yet is valuable to 
others may seem to argue for giving people property rights in information about themselves and letting 
them sell those rights freely.  The process of voluntary exchange would then assure that the information 
was put to its most valuable use.”) 
136
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note __, at 24-29 (critiquing property based theories of 
privacy); Litman, supra note ___, at 1288-1294 (describing various theories of private information as 
property). 
137
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 520 (“Because the user has no property interest 
in personal information, information about the user is free for the taking.”). 
138
  id. (“The government could declare that information about individuals obtained through a 
computer network is owned by the individuals; others could take that information, and use it, only with the 
consent of those individuals.”) 
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and theft.139  It would also facilitate private negotiations between parties about uses of 
personal data.140 
 
While governments can undoubtedly regulate personal information as a property 
right, there is a question as to whether they should.  Property rights in information have 
always been contentious.141  They create concerns about chilling speech.142  Governments 
who create property rights in information therefore must act to preserve the balance 
between those rights and speech.  This is a difficult task and is not always successfully 
achieved in practice.143  In a federal system, the propertization of information can raise 
constitutional questions about which level of government has legislative competence to 
enact relevant laws.  If the state governments are the appropriate bodies to undertake this 
task, problems arise as to interstate harmonization of law, particularly where information 
transcends state, and even national, borders at the press of a button.144   
 
In any event, none of this gets to the underlying question of a policy justification 
for treating private information as property.  It is tempting to accept that if something has 
value, as private information potentially does - depending on the context and how value 
is defined145 - it should be treated as property.  The problem with this reasoning in the 
context of the present discussion is that much of the economic value in online 
information to date has been in text records in the hands of data aggregators.146  While 
there may be good arguments for creating property rights in compilations and databases 
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  id. (“This declaration of [property] rights [in personal information] could … be enforced in any 
number of traditional ways. The state might make theft of such information criminal, or provide special 
civil remedies and incentives to enforce individual rights if such information is taken.”) 
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  Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, supra note ___, at 63. 
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  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note __, at 24-29 (critiquing property based theories of 
privacy); Litman, supra note ___, at 1288-1294 (describing various theories of private information as 
property). 
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  Litman, supra note ___, at 1294-1295 (“Whether or not it could be easily implemented, a privacy-
as-property solution carries with it some serious disadvantages. Our society has a longstanding 
commitment to freedom of expression. Property rights in any sort of information raise significant policy 
and free speech issues. Facts are basic building blocks: building blocks of expression; of self-government; 
and of knowledge itself. When we recognize property rights in facts, we endorse the idea that facts may be 
privately owned and that the owner of a fact is entitled to restrict the uses to which that fact may be put. 
That notion is radical. It is also inconsistent with much of our current First Amendment jurisprudence. 
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  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, surpa note ___, at 129-132 (describing problems in 
attempting to balance privacy torts with the idea of free speech); Zimmerman, supra note ___ (suggesting 
that torts prohibiting true speech cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment); Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:  The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From 
Speaking About You, 52 STAN L REV 1049 (2000) (suggesting that tortious approaches to protecting 
privacy cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment, but that contractual approaches may avoid this 
criticism). 
144
  There may also be copyright preemption problems in some jurisdictions depending on the nature 
of the property rights created. 
145
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, 78-100 (detailed attempt to ascribe various 
possible values to different aspects of privacy). 
146
  Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1502-3 (noting that the value of a piece of data in a consumer’s 
hands is much less than the value of the aggregated data about many consumers in a data aggregator’s 
hands).  
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in the hands of data aggregators,147 it is not necessarily true that personal information in 
the hands of the individual to whom it relates is a valuable commodity in terms that 
justify a property right.148   
 
Even where information in a video format is aggregated in forums like OSNs, 
there is little theoretical justification for granting a property right to either the data subject 
or the person who controls the photograph.149  This is because the private individuals 
networking over OSNs are not likely doing so for commercial purposes that would justify 
or necessitate a property right either in data about them or in data about others that 
appears on their personal webpages.  There may be a justification for importing a 
property right to the provider of an OSN in respect of its meta-collection of data.  This is 
because the OSN operators might argue that they do utilize this data for commercial 
purposes.  However, even that argument is tenuous in situations where an OSN does not 
transact with the data per se, but rather utilize their vast collection of users as an 
incentive to attract advertisers.150 
 
Of course, not all property rights are justified on the basis of economic value.  
Many theoretical conceptions of property do not require economic value as a necessary 
element, and some commentators have argued that just because something has a 
commercial value does not mean that it automatically merits a property label.151  While 
value and property are often aligned, it is not necessarily the case that something must be 
commercially valuable to be property or that something must be property if it has a 
commercial value.  An old dog-eared copy of a Shakespeare play, for example, may no 
longer have any real economic value, but it will still be property.  On the other hand, a 
person’s time may be valuable, but it will not necessarily be property. 
 
  Even traditional property rights may be characterized by things other than 
commercial value.  These things might comprise the ability to exclude others, the ability 
to enjoy an item free from interference, or the ability to alienate or transfer rights in the 
                                                 
147
  See, for example, Jerome Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Data?, 50 VAND L REV 51 (1997); Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies:  
Reconceptualizing Property Rights in Databases 18 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 773 (2003). 
148
  Froomkin, supra note ___, at 1502-3 (noting that the value of a piece of data in a consumer’s 
hands is much less than the value of the aggregated data about many consumers in a data aggregator’s 
hands). 
149
  Of course, the person who controls the photograph is likely to own copyright in the photograph by 
default, even if she has no intention of making any commercial use from the photograph:  17 U.S.C. § 
102(a)(5) (includes copyright in photographs under definition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” 
in 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
150
  Although this may be changing in practice.  Recent attempts at social ad programs by some OSNs 
do utilize specific data about individuals and their online relationships with friends to better target 
advertising to their users:  William McGeveran, Facebook Inserting Users Into Ads, Info/Law, November 
8, 2007 (available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/11/08/facebook-social-ads/, last viewed on 
July 24, 2008); Megan McCarthy, Facebook Ads Make You the Star – and You May Not Know It, Wired 
Blog Network, January 2, 2008 (available at http://blog.wired.com/business/2008/01/facebook-ads-
ma.html, last viewed on July 24, 2008). 
151
  LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 19 (“But the “if value, then right” theory of creative 
property has never been America’s theory of creative property.  It has never taken hold within our law.”) 
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item whether or not for commercial value.152  These typical proprietary attributes are 
generally missing from personal information.  It would be very difficult for any 
individual to meaningfully function in society, particularly online, without leaving 
footprints involving disclosures of personal information.  Thus, there is no meaningful 
way of excluding others from personal information or to enjoy the information free from 
interference.  Sometimes information is required by others, as by contract, to complete a 
purchase.153  Other times the information is incidentally observed as part of functioning in 
society: for example, if you go to the shops, people will see what you look like, an image 
of you may be captured on a security camera in a department store, etc.154  Online, 
individuals constantly leave digital footprints involving this kind of information.155   
 
Of course, advocates of property rights in personal information may well argue 
that it is these very aspects of personal privacy that require a property label.  The 
necessity of transacting with personal information on a day to day basis requires that the 
individual be entitled to bargain for value for exchanges involving this information.156  
However, this is a circular argument.  It assumes that something should be labeled 
property because individuals are effectively forced to disclose it and therefore they 
should be compensated for doing so.  This might be justified on the basis of some kind of 
unjust enrichment theory.  In other words, data aggregating businesses are unjustly 
enriched by individuals if they can put together valuable consumer profiles using 
information “belonging to” others without compensating them for it.   
 
However, unjust enrichment actions are not of necessity based on the 
identification of a property right in the plaintiff.157  Thus, an unjust enrichment analysis 
does not necessarily resolve the privacy-as-property question.  Additionally, the unjust 
enrichment solution would also suffer from the fact that restitution law has an uncertain 
theoretical basis.158  Unjust enrichment may be an equally unstable basis for protecting 
privacy interests as property theory.  Outside of property and restitution theory, there may 
be arguments based on autonomy and personhood for granting legal rights in personal 
privacy.159  In the context of attempting to explain the philosophical underpinnings of the 
                                                 
152
  Courtney Tedrow, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L REV 
586, 591 (2000) (identifying classic property rights as including rights of exclusion, disposition, and use).   
153
  For example, details of a credit card or postal address for payment or shipping purposes. 
154
  Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN L REV 1193, 1198 (1998). 
155
  id. 
156
  Bartow, supra note ___, at 704 (“Once I own my own data, I personally look forward to 
formulating a reverse “click-wrap” license, whereby any enterprise that wants me to visit its web site will 
have to agree to MY list of terms and conditions …”). 
157
  Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF L REV 1191, 1214 (1995) (“Restitution can be 
seen as an aspect of the legal protection of property, and many instances of what the law characterizes as 
unjust enrichment might be described by saying that the defendant has received property of the plaintiff by 
means of a transfer that was legally ineffective to convey ownership …. But while the remedy for 
defendant's unjust enrichment will often involve restoring something to the plaintiff, remedies that consist 
in restoration are by no means coextensive with liability for unjust enrichment.”) 
158
  id, at 1191 (1995) (“Significant uncertainty shrouds the modern law of restitution. Few American 
lawyers, judges, or law professors are familiar with even the standard propositions of the doctrine, and the 
few who are continue to disagree about elementary issues of definition.”) 
159
  Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF L REV 1087, 1116-1121 (2002) (discussion of 
personhood theories of privacy) (hereinafter, “Conceptualizing Privacy”); Solove, Nothing to Hide, supra 
note ___, at 760-1 (noting that many theories of privacy view the notion of privacy as an individual right 
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right of publicity, which is derived from the right to privacy, various commentators have 
suggested basing such rights in notions of autonomy and personhood.160  This is a 
possibility, but again, the theoretical contours of a right of personhood are unclear,161 and 
the theory may not be any more useful than trying to pin down a privacy right as a form 
of property. 
 
One question that might be worth posing at this point is whether it is actually 
necessary to create one single philosophical underpinning for online privacy rights, at 
least at this very moment.162  This is clearly a time when individuals feel that they are 
being harmed, to a greater or lesser extent, by much online conduct that interferes with 
their ability to control their own personas in cyberspace.163  Nevertheless, there is 
currently little consensus within academia or legal practice as to the nature and scope of 
individual privacy rights.  It may be that the legal label ultimately attached to privacy 
rights, and the philosophical underpinnings justifying that label, need to be developed in 
the future as the contours of the rights develop over time.164   
 
In other words, it may be that the various regulatory modalities for information 
privacy need a chance to work together over time ultimately to create a situation where it 
is easier to identify the legal nature of, and philosophical justification for, distinct online 
privacy rights.  It may be that for the time being, all we need to do is think about privacy 
rights in terms of some form of control mechanism relating to the permitted accesses and 
uses of personal information online.165  Obviously, this mechanism needs to be balanced 
against other interests including free speech and, probably to some extent, intellectual 
property law.166 
                                                                                                                                                 
related to protecting the individual’s personal dignity); Sánchez Abril, supra note ___, at 7-8 (“[O]thers 
have defined privacy in terms of personhood, intimacy, and secrecy.”); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING 
PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 29-34 (critiquing “personhood” theories of privacy). 
160
  See discussion in Lipton, Celebrity in Cyberspace, supra note ___, at ___. 
161
  In the right of publicity context, see, for example, discussion in Mark McKenna, The Right of 
Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U PITT L REV 225 (2005); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who?  
The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J 383 (1999). 
162
  In fact, this is arguably the approach taken by Professor Solove who prefers taking a “bottom-up” 
approach to identifying and resolving related privacy problems as the basis for his taxonomy of privacy, 
rather than identifying one overarching theoretical principle to explain privacy rights: SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 105 (“My taxonomy’s categories are not based upon any 
overarching principle.  We do not need overarching principles to understand and recognize problems …. If 
we focus on the problems, we can better understand and address them.  I aim to shift the approach to a 
bottom-up focus on problems that are all related to each other, yet not in exactly the same way.  If we study 
the problems together, we can better understand the entire cluster.”) 
163
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___ (the text is replete with examples of ways 
in which individuals and their reputations are being harmed by online conduct). 
164
  Solove, Nothing to Hide, supra note ___, at 759-760 (noting that it might be worth taking an 
approach that focuses on solving practical problems of privacy rather than spending too much attention 
trying to discern a perfect theoretical basis for the concept of privacy). 
165
  See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and Policy, 82 OREGON 
LAW REVIEW 695 (2003). 
166
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 87 (“We live in an “age of balancing,” and 
the prevailing view is that most rights and liberties are not absolute.  Because privacy conflicts with other 
fundamental values, such as free speech, security, curiosity, and transparency, we should engage in a 
candid and direct analysis of why privacy interests are important and how they ought to be reconciled with 
other interests.  We cannot ascribe a value to privacy in the abstract.”)  
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This approach is not as foreign as it might seem.  Most intangible property rights 
developed organically as societal and economic needs arose.  Trademarks, for example, 
arose initially to address needs of the commercial community to guard against unfair 
competition practices relating to false or misleading branding of goods and services.167  
There is still some international disagreement as to whether trademarks are appropriately 
characterized as property rights.168  Nevertheless, domestic trademark laws are still able to 
function despite the lack of consensus as to the underlying theoretical explanation of a 
trademark.  Trade secrets are another case in point where theoretical justifications for the 
rights are somewhat varied both within and between jurisdictions.169  Nevertheless, the 
system is able to function in practice.   
 
Even Internet domain names have an uncertain legal status as property.  In some 
contexts they have been regarded as a form of intangible personal property,170 whilst in 
others they are regarded as a pure contractual license.171  Nevertheless, the domain name 
system continues to function, while market forces, social norms, and judicial decisions 
iron out the underlying philosophical creases.  Indeed, Professor Solove, one of this era’s 
leading privacy theorists, advocates a bottom up, problem-solving approach to theorizing 
privacy in the digital age.172  His views reflect that fact that privacy problems in this era 
                                                 
167
  LEXIS, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION DESKBOOK, § 1.01. 
168
  Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L J 1687, 
1693-1694 (1999) (noting in the context of United States law that it is very difficult to find a rationale to 
treat trademarks as a form of property).  This may be compared with jurisdictions like the United Kingdom 
and Australia where trademarks are explicitly defined as a form of personal property in the relevant 
legislation:  Trade Marks Act, U.K. § 2(1) (1994) (“A registered trade mark is a property right obtained by 
the registration of the trade mark under this Act and the proprietor of a registered mark has the rights and 
remedies provided by this Act.”); Trade Marks Act, Austl., § 21(1) (1995) (specifically defining a “trade 
mark” as a personal property right). 
169
  Jacqueline Lipton, Protecting Valuable Commercial Information in the Digital Age:  Law, Policy, 
and Practice, 6 JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW AND POLICY 1, 9-15 (2001) (comparing the theoretical 
treatment of trade secrets in different jurisdictions, including Australia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) (full text available at:  http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/vol6/issue1/lipton.html, last viewed on 
July 24, 2008). 
170
  Kremen v Cohen, 337 F. 3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (domain names treated as property for the 
purposes of California’s conversion law); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (allowing in rem proceedings against 
domain names as property in certain circumstances). 
171
  Network Solutions, Inc v Umbro International Inc, 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000) (domain names not 
regarded as a new form of property for the purpose of garnishment proceedings). 
172
  Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note ___, at  1129 (“[T]his Article advances as 
“approach” to understanding privacy rather than a definition or formula for privacy.  It is an approach 
because it does not describe the sum and substance of privacy but provides guidance in identifying, 
analyzing, and ascribing value to a set of related dimensions of practices.  An approach to conceptualizing 
privacy should aid in solving problems, assessing costs and benefits, and structuring social relationships.  
My approach is from the bottom up rather than the top down because it conceptualizes privacy within 
particular contexts rather than in the abstract.”)  
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require a pragmatic approach173 based on solving particular problems,174 acknowledging 
their differences, while at the same time recognizing their similarities.175 
 
C.  LEGAL RULES AS PRIVACY REGULATOR 
 
1. The Role of Legal Regulation Online 
 
Lawyers have a tendency to regard legal rules as the paramount – and sometimes 
the only – solution to a given problem.176  This is not surprising, given our training.  
Professor Lessig has described legal rules as:  “rules that constrain our behavior by 
threatening punishment if we do not obey.”177  He also notes that the law threatens 
punishment after the fact for failure to comply with pre-set rules.178  Laws have limits as a 
regulatory modality, especially online.  In particular, an effective enforcement 
mechanism has to be created to ensure that laws are appropriately enforced.  This does 
not mean one hundred percent enforcement, but at least sufficient enforcement – or threat 
of enforcement – to constrain the behavior of individuals to comport legal rules.  This is 
difficult in the online context.  Enforcement can be problematic where many online actors 
are anonymous, or are situated in different jurisdictions.  Identifying potential defendants, 
and enforcing laws against them can be very tricky in cyberspace.  These problems can 
also involve significant costs to potential plaintiffs or government agencies seeking to 
bring action against alleged online wrongdoers.   
 
Governments also often need to make difficult policy choices in enacting new 
laws, particularly where those laws seek to balance competing interests such as privacy, 
speech, and property rights.  The novelty of much online conduct exacerbates the 
difficulties for governments in identifying appropriate policies on which to base legal 
regulation.  Governments often look to social norms to discern an appropriate policy 
basis for new laws.  In areas like online social networking, where many social norms are 
not fully developed, governments will have difficulty identifying appropriate policy 
justifications and balances for new laws. 
 
                                                 
173
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 87-88 (describing pragmatic approach to 
privacy theory). 
174
  id, at 75 (“I contend that the focal point for a theory of privacy should be the problems we want 
the law to address.”) 
175
  Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U PA L REV 477, 486-7 (2006) (“The taxonomy [of 
privacy] demonstrates that there are connections between different harms and problems.  It is no accident 
that various problems are referred to as privacy violations; they bear substantial similarities to each other.  
But we also must recognize where they diverge.  The goal is to define more precisely what the problem is 
in each context – how it is unique, how it differs from other problems, and how it is related to other types 
of privacy problems.”). 
176
  LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 121 (“Law is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers at 
least).”) 
177
  Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 507 (“Law … orders people to behave in certain 
ways; it threatens punishment if they do not obey.  The law tells me not to buy certain drugs, not to sell 
cigarettes without a license, and not to trade across international borders without first filing a customs form. 
It promises strict punishments if these orders are not followed. In this way, we say that law regulates.”). 
178
  LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note ___, at 121 (“[L]aw constrains by threatening punishment 
after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated.”). 
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Legal rules are therefore unlikely to be the stand-alone answer to privacy 
problems involving online video dissemination.  Laws will have some place, likely an 
important place,179 in the overall regulatory matrix, but they cannot solve online privacy 
problems on their own.  The challenge for regulators is to identify exactly what role legal 
rules should play in relation to online video privacy issues, and how those rules should 
interact with other forms of regulation.  Recently, commentators have made some 
suggestions along these lines.  Professor Solove suggests that even though legal 
regulation will not be the complete answer to our online privacy problems,180 online 
privacy regulation could be bolstered by the law:  (a) recognizing privacy in public;181 (b) 
better protecting confidential relationships;182 and, (c) allowing individuals to exercise 
greater control over their personal information after it has been exposed to other people 
or even to the general public.183   
 
There are, in fact, a number of specific areas in which laws might be enacted, 
modified or strengthened to assist in combating online privacy incursions in the situations 
under consideration in this article.  They include: (a) torts protecting rights of privacy and 
publicity; (b) legislation promoting codes of conduct and technical standards for 
protecting privacy; and, (c) contracts and breach of confidence actions.  Additionally, 
there are models for laws regulating information that could usefully be adapted to address 
privacy interests online.  In this context, privacy law might draw some inspiration from 
lessons learned previously in digital copyright law and environmental regulation. 
 
2. Lessons from Digital Copyright Law 
 
Professor Solove has noted some of the parallels between the regulation of online 
privacy and the regulation of copyright online.184  In particular, he identifies ways in 
which copyright law has managed to effectively protect copyrights in online video, 
despite early concerns about the ability of rights holders to exercise control over digital 
information.185  He uses the example of digital copyright law to answer those who suggest 
that it is impossible to regulate privacy online because it is too difficult to obtain effective 
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  id, at 123 (“While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a special role in 
affecting the three.  The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a 
particular modality.”) 
180
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 193 (“There is … a limit to how much 
the law can do.  The law is an instrument capable of subtle notes, but it is not quite a violin.”) 
181
  id, at 187.  Professor Sánchez Abril has also noted that, while many traditional privacy laws are 
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  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note __, at 187.  See Richards and Solove, Privacy’s 
Other Path, supra note ___. 
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  id, at 188. 
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  id, at 185. 
185
  id, at 184-186. 
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control over digital information.186  He notes that copyright law applies online regardless 
of whether information has been accidentally exposed to the public or not,187 and even if it 
is in a digital format that can be readily copied.188  His point is that the copyright example 
proves that legal rules can control information online, including digital video information 
that is easy to reproduce and disseminate at the push of a button. 
 
In fact, there are many similarities between online privacy regulation and digital 
copyright regulation.  Common issues include:  (a) how to effectively control access to, 
and use of, digitally available information; (b) how to balance the rights of an 
information rights holder against competing interests such as free speech189 and other 
legitimate uses;190 (c) what kinds of liability, if any, should be faced by Internet 
intermediaries, such as Internet service providers, for unauthorized activities of others;191 
(d) identifying appropriate forums for dispute resolution in a global information society; 
(e) dealing with global disharmonization of relevant legal principles;192 (f) identifying 
wrongdoers in a largely anonymous online medium;193 and, (g) providing remedies for 
viral online dissemination of protected information.194  Thus, copyright law may prove a 
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  id., at 184 ([I]s control over information really feasible?  If we expose information to others, isn’t 
it too difficult for the law to allow us still to control it?  Perhaps the law is reticent about granting control 
because of the practical difficulties.  Information spreads rapidly, sometimes like a virus, and it is not easily 
contained.”) 
187
  id, at 185 (“The copyright system focuses on the use of information – it allows certain uses and 
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188
  id. (“[C]opyright law provides protection even when a work can be readily copied.  I don’t have to 
take any steps to protect my work.”) 
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  In fact, Professor Solove notes that copyright protections have proved so strong online that even 
First Amendment concerns yield before copyright:  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, 
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  Legitimate uses might include those traditionally associated with copyright law such as news 
reporting on matters of public interest, and some non profit educational uses.  In the privacy context, 
certain kinds of data aggregation might also be legitimate uses if appropriate safeguards against 
unauthorized privacy invasions are implemented.  See, for example, Whalen v Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) 
(upholding law requiring computerized data aggregation of information relating to prescription of certain 
medications, and acknowledging that appropriate information security safeguards were in place). 
191
  Professor Solove notes that copyright law provides liability when third parties facilitate a 
copyright violation:  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 185. 
192
  For example, the European Union and United States take very different approaches to privacy.  
The European Union approach is largely codified in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data (the “Data Protection Directive”).  The United States, on the 
other hand, takes a more piecemeal approach to private data protection:  RAYMOND KU AND JACQUELINE 
LIPTON, CYBERSPACE LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS, 544 (2 ed, 2006) (“[T]o date, the United States 
largely relies upon unfair and deceptive business practice law and self-regulation [to protect privacy].  In 
contrast, other nations, and most notably, the European Union have taken more aggressive steps to protect 
individual privacy in data collection.”) 
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  17 U.S.C. § 512 allows copyright holders, for example, to seek identifying information about 
alleged copyright infringers from third party services providers.  See also In re Verizon Internet Services, 
Inc, 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003) (Internet service provider (“ISP”) challenging subpoena served on 
it by the Recording Industry Association of America seeking identifying information for alleged copyright 
infringers utilizing the ISP’s services.)  
194
  As Professor Solove notes, copyright law will provide remedies even when information has been 
exposed to public view and has not been protected by the information holder against potential viral 
distribution:  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 184-5. 
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useful model for enhanced privacy regulations online, particularly with respect to privacy 
rights in video files.   
 
Of course, copyrights are also specific legal rights that need to be balanced 
against privacy rights online.  The holder of the copyright in a video file will not 
necessarily be the subject of the video image.  Copyright ownership will usually fall to 
the person who takes a photograph, not likely the subject of the image.195  Because today 
we have strong copyright laws and relatively weak privacy laws, at least in the United 
States, the copyright holder will generally win any battle for control of an online video 
image.196  This does not necessarily have to be the case.  Strengthened privacy laws could 
help to redress this imbalance.197   
 
In any event, the copyright model could be a useful basic model for those seeking 
to strengthen privacy rights online.  Although digital copyright law has arguably created 
its own imbalances,198 those seeking to enact laws that protect privacy rights online could 
learn from the past problems of digital copyright law, while taking away the lesson that 
online information control through legal regulation is not impossible.  Of course even 
digital copyright law has been bolstered in many respects by contract law and technical 
standards.199  It is another example of an area where legal regulation alone is not 
sufficient as a regulatory modality, and where the law needs to interact with other 
regulatory modalities.  It is also an example of an area of law where balancing competing 
interests is important.  Privacy law advocates now have an opportunity to get the balance 
right in the wake of some of the arguable failures of digital copyright law in this respect. 
 
3. Lessons from Environmental Regulation 
 
Environmental regulation is another area of law that may be instructive as a 
model for protecting online privacy.  Professor Hirsch, for example, draws on some of 
the more recent legislative approaches to environmental protection as a possible model 
for online privacy law.200  He identifies the way in which environmental law has moved 
away from command and control models201 towards second generation initiatives that 
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  id., at 184 (“Copyright in a photo is owned initially by the person who takes the photo, not by the 
person whose photo is taken.”) 
196
  Professor Solove recounts a story where, in a battle for control of such an image online, the holder 
of copyright in the photograph was able to control a photograph of a radio call-in show host – Dr Laura 
Schlessinger – even against Dr Schlessinger herself:  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 
___, at 183-184. 
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  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 185 (noting that the development of 
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  Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 WIRED (Jan. 1996) (available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper.html, last viewed on July 23, 2008); LESSIG, FREE 
CULTURE, supra note ___. 
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  Michael Madison, Legal-Ware:  Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L REV 
1025 (1998) (discussing uses of contractual and technological measures with copyright law in attempts by 
copyright holders to protect their rights online). 
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  Dennis D Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment:  What Privacy Regulation can Learn from 
Environmental Law, 41 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 1 (2006). 
201
  id., at 8. 
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encourage regulated parties to choose for themselves the means by which they will 
achieve regulatory goals.202  He then draws on similarities between environmental 
regulation and information regulation,203 to suggest lessons for information privacy law 
that could usefully be drawn from the experience of environmental protection legislation.  
He suggests that we look to the law as a means to facilitate the development of market 
forces to achieve desired regulatory goals.204  Rather than suggesting enhanced 
information privacy laws of the command and control variety, Professor Hirsch advocates 
utilizing legal rules to set regulatory goals and to incentivize market players to achieve 
those goals.205   
 
Professors Mulligan and Simitian have taken this reasoning a step further in 
discussing the efficacy of security breach notification laws in the United States.206  
Professors Mulligan and Simitian identify information disclosure laws in the 
environmental context as a useful analogy with information disclosure laws about 
security breaches in the online privacy context.207  They note that information disclosure 
laws in both contexts facilitate the flow of information into the marketplace and allow 
market participants to make better and more efficient decisions about complying with 
regulatory goals.208  In the environmental law context, the goals may be to reduce 
pollution emissions.  In the information security context, the goals may be to better 
secure private information and to avoid data security breaches in the future.  Professors 
Mulligan and Simitian note that laws requiring companies that collect personal 
information to disclose security breaches in relation to that information might give those 
corporations, and others, sufficient market incentives to invest in technology to prevent 
such breaches.209  This again evidences the important interplay between legal rules and 
market forces as regulators.  Of course, none of this specifically relates to the protection 
of privacy in digital video images, but models could be developed to enhance video 
privacy based on the interplay of laws and market forces along these lines.  Some 
suggestions are considered in Part III.E infra. 
 
4. Privacy and Publicity Torts 
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Having considered the viability of legal models for regulating information 
generally, it is now appropriate to turn to specific areas of law that might be extended to 
protect privacy interests in online video.  An obvious port of call is the rather uncohesive 
set of privacy torts in the United States210 which can be largely traced back to the work of 
Dean Prosser in 1960.211  One or more of these torts could be strengthened to operate 
more effectively in an online world.  Professor Sanchez Abril, for example, has suggested 
strengthening the tort relating to public disclosure of private facts212 to allow it to operate 
more effectively in the OSN context.213  She notes that the public disclosure tort 
developed at a time when the law was concerned with intrusions into physical spaces,214 
and is thus not well suited to a non-physical online world.215  She suggests re-focusing 
enquiries about public versus private activities, in the context of the public disclosure 
tort, to better meet the needs of the information society.  In particular, she suggests:  (a) 
thinking about zones of confidentiality created by system architecture, agreements and 
relationship bonds, rather than physical walls;216 (b) categorizing privacy harms that 
ensue from information disclosure rather than categorizing certain subject matter as per 
se private;217 and, (c) thinking in terms of overall accessibility of online information 
rather than in terms of whether it was completely secret or secluded.218 
 
Related to the privacy torts is the right of publicity.  This tort prevents the use of 
someone else’s name or likeness for financial benefit.219  Professor Solove has suggested 
that the right of publicity could be expanded to help individuals control uses and 
dissemination of their images online.220  As currently formulated, the publicity rights tort 
is limited to unauthorized commercial uses of an individual’s name or likeness.  Thus, it 
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  Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 652A-E (1997). 
211
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note ___, at 101 (describing the four types of harmful 
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  GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an 
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220
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 187 (“The appropriation tort might be 
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does not cover many of the situations arising by unauthorized posting and dissemination 
of photographs on OSNs.  Most of these uses are not for commercial gain, but merely for 
amusement and discussion.221  Professor Solove recognizes that the right of publicity 
could be strengthened for use in this context, but, as with utilizing the copyright model to 
strengthen online privacy rights, difficult balancing issues would need to be resolved.222  
Professor Solove suggests that one might find this balance in ensuring that the 
appropriation tort could only apply:  “when people’s photos are used in ways that are not 
of public concern.”223  This would be consistent with recognized limitations of the public 
disclosure tort.224  The appropriation limb of Dean Prosser’s privacy torts225 is clearly 
related to the right of publicity tort, so similar comments would apply to extending this 
arm of privacy law to OSNs as to the right of publicity tort. 
 
However, the other elements of American privacy tort law are less promising for 
the situations under consideration in this article.  The intrusion tort226 relates largely to 
incursions into one’s physical space or private affairs.  It is unlikely to cover concerns 
about unauthorized dissemination of video images often captured with the consent of the 
image subject.  Of course, the scope of this tort might be expanded to define an intrusion 
more broadly, perhaps in a way that contemplates intrusions into a person’s peace of 
mind by unauthorized use or dissemination of a private image.  However, this does seem 
a stretch and it may not always be easy to ascertain the scope of such an intrusion.  The 
suggestions of Professors Solove and Sanchez Abril seem to be simpler avenues to 
achieve the desired result here. 
 
The false light publicity tort227 is likewise not well suited to online video 
situations because it is not aimed at truthful information – and images of an individual 
will generally represent something truthful unless they have been altered in some way to 
imply something untrue about the subject.  An example might be photoshopping228 an 
image to make it seem that the subject was drinking or taking drugs.  Outside of the 
obvious photoshopping example, it may be very difficult in particular cases to establish 
false light in relation to an image that is effectively truthful in that it accurately recorded 
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a person in a given situation.  Again, Professors Sanchez Abril’s and Solove’s 
suggestions relating to extending the scope of the public disclosure tort and the publicity 
rights tort respectively are probably better solutions to the problems identified here than 
attempting to establish false light in the video privacy context.   
 
5. Privacy Contracts and Breach of Confidence Actions 
 
Another area where legal rules could better protect online privacy rights is 
through the use of express or implied contracts, and breach of confidence actions.  These 
issues are treated together because they all rely on relationships between specific 
individuals.  Express or implied contracts arise from the conduct of the parties and their 
intention to enter into legally binding obligations.  Breach of confidence actions can arise 
from contract law or can be imposed externally by the legal system to protect a 
relationship that the law regards as requiring a particularly high duty of confidentiality 
because of its very nature.  Examples are the doctor-patient relationship and the preacher-
penitent relationship.229 
 
Relationships that give rise to legal obligations of confidence are a good model 
for the legal regulation of privacy.  The problem is that the kinds of situations addressed 
in this article relating to online video privacy do not generally involve relationships that 
the law would currently regard as involving legal obligations of confidence.  However, 
this could change.  Express contracts of confidentiality might be problematic here 
because it is unlikely that private individuals taking images of each other and posting 
them online have the time, inclination, or experience to enter into express contracts to 
protect each other’s privacy.  However, implied contracts recognized by the legal system 
might be a viable alternative. 
 
Several commentators have recognized that implied contracts, and even express 
contracts in some circumstances, could be utilized in interpersonal relationships for legal 
enforcement of privacy and confidentiality expectations.  Professor McClurg, for 
example, has suggested the development of implied contracts of confidentiality for 
intimate relationships generally.230  His suggestion contemplates protection for both text-
based information shared in confidence and video information pertaining to the 
relationship in question.231  His particular concern is with dissemination of that 
information online.232  His ideas could be extended to social relationships more broadly, 
particularly those that involve dissemination of information online.   
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  SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note ___, at 214 (giving examples of relationships of 
confidence protected by legal rules, including attorney/client, priest/penitent, husband/wife, and, 
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Professor McClurg’s writings echo suggestions made earlier by both Professor 
Zimmerman233 and Professor Volokh234 about utilizing express or implied contracts, 
rather than tort law, to protect individual privacy.235  Professors Zimmerman and Volokh 
each expressed concern that tort law protections for privacy were generally open to 
criticism as unconstitutional encroachments on the First Amendment freedom of 
speech.236  Professor Volokh suggests that express or implied contracts of confidentiality, 
although not a perfect solution for privacy advocates, are the only legal method of 
avoiding these First Amendment concerns.237  However, he identifies two important 
limitations of contractual solutions for protecting privacy that may have significant 
ramifications in cyberspace.  The first is that contractual enforcement will generally not 
apply to third parties, unless, for example, the third party can be found to be an agent of 
one of the contracting parties.238  In the OSN situation, people disseminating each other’s 
images online are unlikely to be in contractual relationships with the image subjects for 
the most part, and are also unlikely to be agents of image subjects or of image takers.  
The second limitation of contractual solutions is that contracts cannot be enforced against 
minors.239  This may be a significant problem in the OSN context because presumably 
many people sharing images online are minors.  Contractual solutions may also pose 
jurisdictional problems online given the global nature of the Internet. 
 
In a similar vein to those suggesting the recognition of implied contracts of 
confidentiality, some commentators have suggested the extension of breach of confidence 
torts to better protect individual privacy.  Professors Solove and Richards suggest 
extending American breach of confidence tort jurisprudence in a manner that draws from 
current British law on breach of confidence.240  They note that British law, by default, 
currently protects a greater array of relationships of confidence than American law.241  
With respect to the First Amendment concerns raised by Professors Zimmerman and 
Volokh, Professors Solove and Richards acknowledge that any tort law solution to 
privacy problems is open to First Amendment challenge, and that tortious breach of 
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confidence actions may be subject to the same critique.242  However, they suggest that 
torts based on relationships may be less objectionable than torts generally enforceable 
against the world where it comes to encroachments on speech.243   
 
Nevertheless, there are some limitations to the tort approach, even when based on 
relationships of confidence.  Professors Solove and Richards have noted that the English 
breach of confidence tort is subject to a number of exceptions including: (a) consent; (b) 
information being trivial; (c) information being in the public domain; and, (d) 
information being in the public interest.244  While the latter two issues are unlikely to be 
of much relevance to the situations contemplated in this article, the first two limitations 
on the action are potentially problematic.  As noted in the opening section of this article, 
many digital images are taken with consent.  This does not necessarily mean that they are 
disclosed with the consent of the image subject, although there will be a serious question 
as to what a consent to a disclosure means in this context.  If the image subject consents 
to the posting of an image on a friend’s Facebook page, does that contemplate 
downstream uses by others who may access the image from the friend’s page?   
 
There is also the potential limitation that much information posted on OSNs is 
trivial and should not give rise to tortious actions for breach of confidence.  Again, there 
are going to be some serious definitional problems here.  Is it the information per se that 
might be identified as trivial, or rather the context of its use online?  For example, the 
“Star Wars Kid” episode and the “dog poop girl” episode both revolve around digital 
information that is per se fairly trivial.  After all, how important is it that someone’s dog 
pooped on the subway or that some kid played with a golf ball retriever as if it was a light 
saber from Star Wars?  The resulting harassment and embarrassment caused to the image 
subject in each case was far from trivial on a personal level,245 yet this is a result of the 
nature of the use of the images online, rather than the nature of the information contained 
in the images.  An otherwise fairly trivial image can take on a life of its own online.   
 
Paradoxically, the triviality criterion that has previously cut against tort liability 
for unauthorized disclosures would now arguably cut against First Amendment concerns 
online.  If information is trivial, there is arguably less need for the First Amendment to 
protect it.  Thus, if we are talking about balancing free speech interests against privacy, it 
may be that the potential harm from disseminating even trivial information online so 
seriously outweighs any First Amendment concerns that there should be no constitutional 
objection to a tortious action here.   
 
Another limitation of the breach of confidence tort on its own is that it does not 
deal effectively with data aggregation, and sometimes associated identification, 
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problems246 such as those arising in the “dog poop girl” scenario.  It was not only the 
subway passenger’s image that was ultimately posted on the Internet.  It was augmented 
by various Internet users with information relating to her identity and contact details.247  
This allowed her to be easily harassed and shamed in an ongoing way, and ultimately 
resulted in her quitting her job248 – a result of the permanence problem.  An enhanced 
breach of confidence tort action for the information age may well need to better take 
account of the problems of viral distribution, aggregation, identification, and indeed, 
information permanence, than existing legal models.  Thus, solutions to privacy invasions 
based on contractual or tortious breaches of relationships of confidence are a possible 
solution to some of the problems addressed in this article.  However, neither of them are 
currently sufficiently developed to deal with these problems effectively. 
 
6. Legislating Codes of Conduct and Technical Standards 
 
Another way in which legal rules might be used to enhance privacy protections 
involves utilizing laws to encourage certain social behaviors and technical standards.  
This is perhaps an analog to the discussion of the environmental regulation model of 
legislating best practices to encourage markets to behave in a particular way.  Here, we 
are talking about legislating best practices to encourage either markets or individuals, or 
both, to behave in a particular way in terms of appropriate social conduct or the use and 
development of particular technical standards to protect privacy. 
 
Professors Edwards and Brown, for example, suggest the possibility of 
developing voluntary codes of conduct or imposing legislation on OSNs with respect to 
their default privacy settings.249  Drawing on the experience of the Directive on Privacy 
and Electronic Communications in the European Union,250 Professors Edwards and 
Brown surmise that legislating mandatory privacy default settings may prove more 
effective in protecting individual privacy than leaving the market to its own devices.251  
One advantage of such legislated privacy-protecting default settings would be that they 
would also reinforce social norms relating to adequate privacy protections online.252  This 
is a good example of the interplay between legal rules and emerging social norms. 
 
In a similar vein, Professor Froomkin has suggested the enactment of legal rules 
to encourage the use of privacy enhancing technologies.253  He has expressed skepticism 
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about self-regulation, even given the availability of appropriate privacy enhancing 
technologies.254  He advocates the interplay of legislation and resulting market forces to 
more appropriately protect privacy online.255  He refers predominantly to text-based data 
aggregation problems in the early days of the Internet, rather than to peer disseminations 
of digital video images.  However, his comments about the necessary interplay between 
laws and market forces to encourage privacy-enhancing behaviors online are equally 
applicable in this next context.  He also advocates utilizing law to encourage the 
incorporation of privacy protections into system design.256  This evidences the need for 
an interplay between law, market forces, and system architecture as modes of regulation 
to protect Internet privacy. 
 
Legal rules do not only shape behavior through enforcement – or the threat of 
enforcement.  They are also part of a large and complex matrix of regulatory modalities 
that shape behavior through a combination of carrots and sticks.  In this context, legal 
rules serve a variety of functions.  They can command compliance with certain specific 
rules in the command and control paradigm.  They can also both reflect and shape social 
norms.  Lawmakers will likely be guided by social norms in enacting rules that reflect 
society’s expectations about acceptable conduct.  However, laws can also shape social 
norms, as suggested by Professors Edwards and Brown observing that using law to 
mandate default technological privacy settings can help to shape emerging social norms 
about acceptable use of personal material online.257  Legal rules can also interact with 
market forces, as observed by Professor Froomkin.258  Professor Gavison also suggested 
the development of aspirational legal rules – such as a general explicit legal commitment 
to privacy protection.  This would presumably be a way to help educate society about 
appropriate behavior with respect to personal information.259  Thus, the law can play 
various roles in protecting online privacy generally, as well as specifically in the context 
of OSNs.  The goal for law and policy makers should be to identify the appropriate legal 
rules to combat privacy problems online, and to ensure that these rules are suitably 
tailored to the problems they are intended to address.  Importantly, legal rules need to 
interact efficiently and effectively with other regulatory modalities.    
 
D.  SOCIAL NORMS AS PRIVACY REGULATOR 
 
Social norms are an extremely important form of regulation.260  A norm may be 
defined as:  “a rule governing an individual’s behavior that is diffusely enforced by third 
parties other than state agents by means of social sanctions.”261  Norms can, in fact, be 
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more significant than laws,262 particularly in areas that involve high levels of social 
interaction, like privacy.  As Professor Zimmerman has observed, “As a general rule, 
legal standards for behavior cannot vary too greatly from accepted community practices 
without creating a risk that the community will totally disregard the law.”263  Thus, norms 
should inform the development of legal regulations, particularly where the laws are 
intended to create standards for behavior.264 
 
The problem with cyberspace in this context, is that many norms are not yet well 
developed, meaning that it can be difficult in cyberspace to identify “accepted 
community practices”.  Particularly in relation to OSNs, norm development is in its 
infancy because of the relative novelty of social networking technology.  Add to that the 
problems of globalization – are we talking about one global society’s norms?  Or rather 
an overlapping group of online societies, like the overlapping networks of “friends” on an 
OSN?  Yet another problem of identifying privacy norms online relates to the ambiguity 
or cognitive disconnect that seems constantly to arise when people are surveyed about 
online privacy.  In the few surveys that have been conducted on attitudes to online 
privacy, respondents generally rate the idea of privacy in the abstract very highly.265  
However, they are prepared to bargain with their privacy for a very small price.266  An 
online shopping coupon may well entice an individual to disclose voluminous personal 
details with little regard to future uses of that information.267 
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In 1983, Professor Zimmerman observed that the American privacy torts at that 
time established norms for behavior that deviated substantially from accepted social 
practices.268  This problem has likely been exacerbated today with the rise of OSNs and 
other peer activities online.  Indeed, as recently as 2006, Professor McClurg noted that 
the primary social constraints online are conscience and common sense, and that these 
attributes are “missing in many people”.269  So how do we identify and enforce social 
norms as they relate to content, particularly video content, shared over OSNs?   
 
Some empirical work may be helpful here, although, even empirical work has its 
limits with respect to online privacy because individuals tend to undervalue their personal 
information.270  There is an argument that empirical work may suffer less from this 
privacy myopia problem271 in the OSN context than in the text-based data aggregation 
context.  In the latter context, where much of the survey work has been done so far, 
consumers’ abstract expectations of privacy are often not aligned with their behavior 
when faced with the choice of trading their information for some minor commercial 
benefit, such as online shopping coupons or frequent flyer miles.272  In the OSN context, 
on the other hand, there is little prospect of individuals bargaining with their personal 
information for any commercial benefit,273 so survey results about privacy expectations in 
this context may be more appropriately aligned with the way people actually behave 
online. 
 
If it is possible to ascertain any social expectations about online privacy in the 
OSN context, these could usefully be reduced to Internet guidelines, somewhat akin to 
the way that “Netiquette” developed in the early days of the Internet.  Netiquette might be 
defined as:  “the rules of etiquette that apply when communicating over computer 
networks, esp. the Internet”.274  In the early days of the Internet, netiquette generally 
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274
  See dictionary.com definition of “netiquette”, available at 
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referred to attempts to articulate appropriate social norms with respect to the new email 
technologies available at the time.  In 1995, for example, Intel275 promulgated a set of 
guidelines in the form of a generally available memo for the Internet community.  This 
memo was headed “Netiquette Guidelines”276 and contained suggestions about 
appropriate use of email services for the then-new generation of Internet users who had 
not “grown up with the Internet”.277   
 
The idea was to set down a minimum set of appropriate email behaviors that 
organizations and individuals could adapt for their own use.278  The Netiquette 
Guidelines also recognized the role of Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) and others who 
may provide access to email services in developing rules and norms for appropriate email 
use.  The introductory section of the Guidelines explains that:  “Individuals should be 
aware that no matter who supplies their Internet access, be it an Internet Service Provider 
through a private account, or a student account at a University, or an account through a 
corporation, that those organizations have regulations about ownership of mail and files, 
about what is proper to post or send, and how to present yourself.  Be sure to check with 
the local authority for specific guidelines.”279  This evidences the interplay of norms, 
laws, and contractual provisions in the development of appropriate online behavior. 
 
There are some parallels between early email netiquette and online behavior 
involving OSNs today.  Private organizations or individuals who may have a stake in the 
future operation of OSNs might encourage the articulation of netiquette principles for 
OSNs that take privacy issues into account.  Indeed, as detailed in Part II.B, many OSN 
service providers do incorporate some privacy provisions into their terms of use.  
However, as also noted above, there are problems with enforcement of these terms 
generally, and with the fact that many victims of privacy incursions are not parties to 
those contracts.  Some OSNs already have stated privacy policies that perhaps resemble 
attempts to articulate new forms of netiquette.280  These are principles available to the 
whole world as statements of best practices by an OSN provider in terms of its 
aspirations to appropriately protect user privacy.281 
 
However, terms of use and privacy policies differ from netiquette and pure social 
norms in the sense that they are generally written from the point of view of an online 
service provider, rather than the individuals utilizing the service.  Thus, they generally 
focus on explaining what the service provider will or will not do with personal 
information, rather than with the kind of respect individual users of the service should 
pay to each other’s privacy.  Emerging online social norms, or netiquette, must take 
account of both.  They must explain the appropriate behavior of online service providers 
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vis-à-vis private individuals, as well as explaining appropriate behavior of individuals 
amongst themselves.282 
 
Some OSNs do attempt to outline a form of netiquette, describing ways in which 
users of their respective services should respect each other’s rights and interests.  
YouTube and Flickr each have a set of “Community Guidelines” that attempt to describe 
ways in which users of the respective online communities should treat each other.283  
Flickr’s guidelines, for example, are expressed as being part of a user’s contract with 
Flickr along with Flickr’s terms of use.284  They cover issues like ensuring that no 
inappropriate content is posted, and remembering that children may be looking at 
information and video files on Flickr.  They additionally include terms like:  “Flickr is 
not a venue for you to harass, abuse, impersonate, or intimidate others. If we receive a 
valid complaint about your conduct, we’ll send you a warning or terminate your 
account”.285  Flickr also includes the simple suggestion:  “Don’t be creepy.”286  The 
guidelines do not say anything specifically about protecting others’ privacy rights, 
although they do talk about protecting other people’s copyrights.287  In particular, Flickr 
suggests ways of amicably resolving copyright disputes by encouraging first that a 
complainant privately contact the alleged copyright violator.  Then, if that does not 
succeed, the complainant is requested to file a notice of infringement with the “Yahoo! 
Copyright Team” who will resolve the matter.288   
 
Interestingly, the Community Guidelines ask users of the service not to “upload 
anything that isn’t theirs”.289  However, closer inspection of the relevant clause implies 
that this is again geared towards copyright protection rather than privacy protection.  The 
succeeding definition of “stuff that isn’t yours” in this context states that:  “This includes 
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other people’s photos, video and/or stuff you've collected from around the Internet.”  The 
possessive pronoun here relates to “photos, videos and other stuff”, suggesting that it is 
the ownership of a digital image that is important to Flickr, rather than the holder of 
privacy interests in relation to the image.  In other words, where the photographer is a 
different person to the photographic subject, it would seem that Flickr’s guidelines only 
contemplate protection of the photographer’s rights in the image, and not the rights of the 
photographic subject.  YouTube’s community guidelines similarly protect copyright, but 
do not specifically mention privacy interests.290 
 
In contrast to services like Flickr and YouTube, some of the closed networks like 
MySpace and Facebook do not have specific sets of Community Guidelines outside of 
their standard terms of use and privacy policies.  This may be because their users are 
automatically regarded as having more control of content because of the closed nature of 
the network, so there is less perceived need to promulgate a set of community 
guidelines.291  In other words, if users are able to limit views of their content to those 
“friends” authorized to view and access their profiles, then there is less need for the 
service provider to promulgate a set of rules about how community members should treat 
each other.  Community members can rely on the technical defaults they set to limit the 
use others may make of their information.292  Of course, as the preceding discussion has 
demonstrated, this is only true to a point, but it may explain the difference in style 
between open and closed networks in terms of the perceived need to articulate 
community guidelines.  
 
Now in the emerging days of OSNs might be a good time to take stock of video 
privacy norms, both through empirical studies and through some attempts to expressly 
articulate norms about privacy in this context. For example, Professors Edwards and 
Brown have recently noted that there currently appear to be no existing social norms 
against the “tagging” of photographs to make them more easily searchable.293  However, 
this issue could be discussed in a forum to develop online best practices between OSN 
users and amongst OSN users and OSN providers.  Salient issues to consider would be 
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whether tagging photographs might somehow impinge on a video subject’s expectations 
of privacy.  Even if an individual has consented to the posting of her image on Facebook, 
and acknowledges the possibility that others may see it and copy it, does that necessarily 
mean that she consents to tagging which enables easier and potentially larger scale 
searching and copying of the image?294  It would be interesting to find out how OSN 
users feel about this issue.  On a more basic level, it would be interesting to try and 
articulate just what kinds of uses or precautions against re-use are expected by those 
sharing video images online.295   
 
The problem of identifying and articulating appropriate social norms for OSNs 
should not be underestimated.  Professor Grimmelman has recently noted that even in the 
context of email – one of the more ubiquitous and long term aspects of Internet 
communication – social norms have their limits.296  Even for email which has relatively 
well developed social norms, the ever-changing landscape of the Internet, in terms of 
increasingly rapid and voluminous connections between ever larger groups of people, 
causes these norms to falter in certain situations.297  Thus, social norms are a useful and 
integral part of Internet communications,298 and should be articulated and developed as a 
meaningful part of Internet regulation generally, and OSN regulation in particular.  
However, norms, like laws, must interact with other modes of regulation to be truly 
effective in practice.   
 
E.  MARKET FORCES AS PRIVACY REGULATOR 
 
Market forces as a regulatory modality often go hand in hand with social norms.  
Social desires and expectations dictate, to a certain extent, what the market is able to sell, 
and, conversely, and perhaps paradoxically, the market can dictate social norms through 
the nature of its products and services.  If all market players provide products that only 
conform with a certain sub-set of possible social behaviors then social behaviors will, by 
default, have to conform with what is available on the market.  However, if the 
consumers are not happy with the available choices, they may either refuse to buy a 
service at all, or they may petition the service provider to change the service to better 
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conform with their desires and expectations.  The immediate user backlash against 
Facebook’s “Beacon” advertising scheme launched in late 2007 is an example of 
consumers demanding changes to an online service to better suit their privacy 
expectations.299 
 
Over the course of Internet governance debates generally, many commentators 
have expressed skepticism about the ability, or inclination, of markets to regulate online 
privacy appropriately.300  The Internet causes the unprecedented ability of online market 
players to make financial gains from individuals’ personal information with very little 
legal recourse available for those who are concerned about protecting their privacy.  
Where the incentives are missing for markets to protect their customers’ privacy, there is 
likely to be little realistic self-regulation absent at least a serious threat of government 
intervention.301 
 
However, in the specific situations under discussion in this article, it is possible 
that industry self-regulation might fare better than it has in the context of text-based data 
aggregation.  In the OSN context, at least as relates to video images, we are not talking 
about information that has commercial value when aggregated into large databases.302  
While text-based information from a personal profile on Facebook might be of interest to 
online marketers, video information is less likely to have any significant appeal.  Even if 
it were possible to utilize images to ascertain whether an image subject might be 
interested in a certain style of clothing, for example, the difficulties in processing video 
information in this way likely outweigh any commensurate benefits of doing so.  
Additionally, video information may not be linked to a particular person’s identity so a 
targeted marketer would have no guidance as to how to target advertisements to an image 
subject.303  The fact that your image is available on my Facebook page does not 
necessarily give a data aggregator searching that image any personally identifying 
information that would necessarily enable them to find you for the purposes of 
aggregating data about you.  Of course, the image may be tagged with some of your 
identifying details, or may be accompanied by text identifying you.  However, it would 
be much more difficult for a data aggregator to profit from this information as it is to deal 
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with text-based information disclosed directly to a company online during an Internet 
purchase - or even personal information derived from tracking a person’s web-surfing 
habits. 
 
Because of these attributes of online video, it is arguable that the interests of OSN 
service providers and those of their users in terms of privacy protection are not so 
disparate as the interests of e-commerce merchants and their consumers.  If the OSN 
service providers obtain more commercial value by protecting their users’ privacy than 
by failing to do so, there may well be market incentives for those service providers to 
compete with each other in offering stronger forms of privacy protections for their users.  
Facebook, for example, does offer more detailed privacy protections in relation to video 
files than some of its competitors as identified in Part II.B.  However, the fact that it has 
strongly worded privacy protections in its terms of use does not necessarily mean that it 
enforces those terms in practice.  Additionally, Facebook is an interesting example in that 
it markets itself as having strong privacy protections.  Nevertheless, it has been strongly 
criticized for attempts to utilize information derived from its users to market items to 
their online “friends”.304   
 
This evidences a distinct practical problem with over-reliance on market forces as 
a form of online privacy regulation.  What an entity says it does, and what it actually 
does, with respect to its users’ privacy may be two different things.  An online service 
provider can use promises of privacy to entice users to accept its services, and then can 
fail to live up to those promises even to the extent of engaging in conduct that seems to 
completely contradict its promises.305  Of course, in a perfect market, the consumer would 
simply take her business elsewhere.  Yet, in online markets there is often no competitive 
“elsewhere” to go.  If you want to interact socially online, you often have little choice 
between service providers, as is often the case in the physical world with a variety of 
products and services.  The other problem that may inhere in cyberspace as it does in the 
physical world is that the terms of service of competing service providers may be so 
complex and different, and difficult to compare, that in the absence of a requirement of 
some standardized format to provide consumers with necessary comparative 
information,306 consumers will be unable to make meaningful choices. 
 
There are a number of other difficulties with reliance on privacy policies to 
protect consumers’ interests online.  There are problems of inequality of bargaining 
power between consumers and online service providers with respect to privacy policies.307  
Even if a large group of consumers objects to a given privacy policy, there are collective 
action problems because it is often difficult in practice for consumers to collectively 
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express to online service providers their privacy preferences.308  The drafting of privacy 
policies in current practice also tends to be fairly toothless in terms of a serious attempt at 
protecting user privacy.  These policies are often drafted in vague, aspirational terms with 
little serious attempt at making specific representations of exactly how a user’s privacy 
will be protected.309  Additionally, privacy policies tend to be regularly updated 
unilaterally by online service providers, thus putting an unrealistic obligation on users to 
routinely check back on the policy to keep track of the privacy terms.310   
 
Market forces may be a useful and important form of online regulation.  However, 
it seems that market incentives are often insufficient in online contexts to effectively 
protect users’ privacy interests.311  This may be an area in which it is necessary for legal 
rules to interact with market forces to create more appropriate outcomes.312  There are a 
number of ways in which the law can interact with markets to achieve more socially 
beneficial outcomes than markets achieve on their own.  Obviously, command and 
control regimes may work here, provided that there is a realistic threat of enforcement of 
laws requiring appropriate levels of privacy protection by online service providers.  A 
command and control regime may, for example, require market players to maintain and 
enforce their privacy policies, with threats of legal action for failure to do so.313   
 
There may also be more subtle ways in which the law can encourage market 
players to act in desired ways.  As noted in Part III.C.3, Professors Mulligan and Simitian 
have observed ways in which data breach disclosure laws can provide necessary 
incentives for markets to engage in best practices when dealing with personally sensitive 
information.314  This model draws to some extent from recent approaches to 
environmental regulation, and can be an effective way to encourage market players to 
invest adequate time and resources into developing best practices in a given area.315  Such 
a model could be extended to encourage online service providers to utilize contractual 
and technological means to protect their users’ privacy.   
 
As noted in Part III.C.6, Professors Edwards and Brown have suggested 
legislation as a way to require market players to utilize certain default privacy settings to 
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protect the privacy interests of their users.316  They also suggest the development of model 
contracts that could be incorporated into OSNs’ terms of use to protect privacy.317  This 
could presumably be achieved as a private market-based exercise or through legislation, 
or a combination of both.  In fact, Professor Solove has additionally suggested that laws 
could be utilized much better than they currently are to ensure meaningful enforcement of 
privacy contracts.318  He notes that, in the past, enforcement of privacy contracts has been 
problematic because courts have generally required proof of monetary damages.319  Laws 
could alter this paradigm to allow compensation for other types of harms resulting from 
infringements of privacy contracts. 
 
As with legal regulation and social norms, market solutions are not, and are never 
likely to be, a perfect form of online privacy regulation on their own.  Nevertheless, in 
concert with the other modes of regulation, they will be an important factor in the 
developing online privacy protection matrix.  Without buy-in from online service 
providers, whether it be obtained through carrots or sticks, or through a combination of 
both, there is little hope of meaningfully protecting privacy online.  While social norms 
between individuals should develop to protect privacy rights online, the cooperation of 
service providers will be necessary to effectively enforce privacy expectations in the 
future. 
 
F.  SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AS PRIVACY REGULATOR 
 
While commentators have generally expressed skepticism about market forces per 
se as privacy regulators, they have been more optimistic about the potential to utilize 
system architecture to better protect online privacy.  Professor Lessig has defined system 
architecture in the privacy context as:  “technologies for re-creating privacy where other 
technologies may have erased it.”320  Many commentators have acknowledged the 
profound impact that system architecture potentially has on personal privacy online.321  
One obvious advantage of architecture as a regulatory modality for privacy is that it is 
more proactive than other forms of regulation, notably legal regulation.322  Architecture 
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creates structures upfront that are intended to prevent harm, while laws generally provide 
remedies when harms occur.323   
 
However, again the problem with reliance on architecture as a privacy regulator is 
that it does not necessarily work well on its own.  Privacy-enhancing technologies can be 
expensive and there is often little to no market incentive for online service providers to 
invest in it.  Already ubiquitous privacy enhancing technologies in the hands of 
consumers that are included in much available software can be problematic in that many 
consumers do not have the technological know-how to use them effectively (or at all).  
The solution may be to “change the default settings” in a number of ways: that is, to sell 
software with the privacy-protecting default settings turned on at their highest level, and 
to require online service providers to invest in technologies to protect their users’ privacy.  
However, this may require legal intervention to achieve the desired results.  Professors 
Edwards and Brown suggest that laws may be needed that require OSN providers to 
change their default positions on privacy.324   
 
One issue for OSNs will be to identify available system architectures to protect 
user privacy.  An obvious example is the closed network format utilized by Facebook and 
MySpace.  These services use available technology to limit users to accessing 
information of other users that they are authorized to access.  On Facebook, for example, 
you cannot access any detailed information about another user unless you ask them if you 
can be their “friend” and they accept you as a “friend” over the network.325  Given the 
easy availability of these options, one might ask why Internet users posting video images 
continually flock to open services like YouTube.  This may be evidence of social norms 
and market forces at play.  Customers who are less concerned about privacy may 
arguably be using open networks and those who are more concerned about privacy are 
flocking to Facebook.326  YouTube is also geared towards audio-visual, multimedia 
content, whereas Facebook caters to a variety of different kinds of content.  That is also a 
function of the respective services’ market segment. 
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There are other examples where technological solutions may be implemented to 
better protect online video privacy.  For example, Professors Edwards and Brown have 
suggested the possibility of automatic data expiration settings to combat the permanency 
problem of digital data in the OSN context.327  Of course, this does not deal with the 
problems of unauthorized dissemination of relevant images prior to the expiration of the 
original posted image, or the permanence of any copies made available on other websites.  
Especially if images have been tagged, they may still be easy to find on multiple websites 
even after the original image has been removed from an online profile.  However, 
automatic expiration settings would, to some extent, limit the availability of personal 
information online.  Additionally, if multiple sites adopted the practice of automatic data 
expiration, then even copied images would eventually be removed from multiple sites, 
thus potentially lessening the permanency problem to some extent. 
 
Technological solutions might also be developed to prevent unauthorized cutting 
and pasting of digital video files in the absence of consent by the image holder and the 
image subject.  For example, code could be written that would prohibit cutting and 
pasting initially, while at the same time sending a request to the image holder and image 
subject to request permission to the dissemination of the image.  The holder and subject 
could then respond, and that response would translate into a permission or non-
permission to the requester to copy the image.  If a response was not received from either 
the image holder or the image subject, the default setting would presumably be to refuse 
permission to copy the image.  Alternatively, or additionally, the image could simply be 
tagged with permissions when originally uploaded.328  This would not prevent 
unauthorized disseminations of images per se, but it would be a use of technology that 
could bring the privacy preferences of the image subject into public view.  Thus, this 
approach may assist in online norm development with respect to the protection of others’ 
privacy.  In fact, some OSNs are experimenting with these kinds of tags.  Facebook has 
offered technology to label photographs in order to indicate what groups of people are 
authorized to view them.329  However, this technological solution is somewhat limited in 
that the relevant tags are lost once an image is copied outside the Facebook network.330  
 
This discussion has not been a comprehensive survey of possible technological 
solutions to video privacy problems.  It is merely intended to establish that there are 
technological options that have not yet been seriously investigated that could better 
protect online video privacy than is currently the case in practice.  Many of the 
technologies that would enable enhanced privacy protection for video images are in 
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existence today and have yet to be applied in this context.331  The failure to apply them 
likely has to do with a combination of factors including: (a) assumptions by some online 
service providers that users’ do not care sufficiently about privacy to make it worth their 
while to employ these technologies;332 (b) lack of awareness of these technologies by 
users; (c) lack of financial incentives for online service providers to develop and deploy 
these technologies;333 and, (d) lack of clarity about current and emerging social norms in 
relation to online privacy, particularly in the video and multi-media context. 
 
Some of the more obvious advantages to developing technological solutions to 
emerging privacy problems are their effectiveness334 and their global reach.335  As noted 
by Professors Edwards and Brown, if OSNs such as Facebook wanted to better protect 
privacy on a global scale, it would be a simple matter for them to create privacy defaults 
as a matter of system architecture that would operate in all countries where Facebook was 
accessible to users.336  These professors further note that such a system could be 
facilitated by a matrix of statutes that legislate for more privacy-friendly default settings, 
thus utilizing law to encourage the development of technological solutions.337  Again, we 
see the likely need for technological solutions to interact with laws and other modes of 
regulation in order to be truly effective in practice.   
 
G.  OTHER MODES OF REGULATION 
 
1. Education as Privacy Regulator 
 
As Professor Lessig suggested in the early days of the Internet, to understand 
online regulation – or any regulation for that matter - it is necessary to understand the 
interplay of at least four regulatory modalities – legal rules, social norms, market forces, 
and system architecture.338  However, this may not be the end of the story.  In recent 
years, commentators have suggested new modes of regulation that may be equally 
important online, particularly with respect to protecting individual privacy interests.  This 
is not inconsistent with Professor Lessig’s work.  He did not claim that the four 
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regulatory modalities that he identified were intended to be comprehensive.339  Other 
forms of regulatory constraint are possible.  Professors Edwards and Brown, for example, 
have suggested the importance of public education as a mode of regulation for privacy 
interests in the OSN context.340  Professor Solove has similarly indicated the importance 
of public education as at least a partial answer to online privacy problems.341 
 
Of course, one may define public education as merely being a subset of social 
norms in the sense that education of the public will ultimately help to identify social 
norms as it will focus the attention of the public on a particular issue in a way likely to 
shape public attitudes about the issue.  However, for present purposes, it may be useful to 
regard public education as a separate subset of information regulation.  This separate 
focus allows us to identify the kinds of education that may become important in the 
privacy context.  We should also consider who has responsibility to educate the public, 
and how prescriptive or otherwise such education may be.  If, for example, social norms 
really are yet to develop in many online privacy contexts, then the education side of the 
regulatory equation, at least at this point in time, should perhaps be aimed at eliciting 
views from the public rather than instructing the public about privacy.  On the other hand, 
the public should certainly be instructed about available privacy-enhancing technologies 
so they might put more pressure on online service providers to employ those technologies 
or make them more widely available.  Additionally, where such technologies are already 
available but the public has little information about how to use them, public education is 
an important form of regulation to address this disconnect. 
 
Professor Froomkin has suggested, at least in the context of unauthorized data 
aggregation, that public education may become a regulatory modality for privacy along 
with other avenues such as technological responses and legal solutions.342  It is probably 
safe to say that public education is an important, if under-utilized, regulatory modality for 
online privacy, both in the video context and with respect to unauthorized uses and 
disseminations of personal information more generally.  Even if the education component 
only consists of explanations about the loss of control people increasingly have over their 
personal information online, this might inform the development of social norms.  It might 
facilitate a situation where Internet users are more cautious about what information they 
disclose online, both about themselves and about their friends and acquaintances. 
 
2.  Institutions as Privacy Regulators 
 
Another possible mode of regulating privacy has recently been suggested by 
Professor Richards.  In the context of conceptualizing a new theory of “intellectual 
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privacy”, he has identified institutions as potential forms of privacy regulators.343  In this 
context, he utilizes the example of libraries, and in particular, the American Library 
Association (“ALA”) in promoting free speech values and intellectual liberty against the 
threat of government surveillance.344  He discusses the ALA’s 1939 library bill of rights 
which declared aspirations of intellectual freedom and privacy of library patrons.345  Of 
course, one might suggest that the idea of “institutions as regulators” is really a subset of 
market forces as a regulatory modality.  However, there are subtle differences.  Market 
forces are determined largely by commercial interests.  Institutional interests, however, 
may be more aspirational and focused on the needs of bettering society generally.   
 
In fact, even Professor Lessig has recognized the work of non-profit institutions 
as a potential regulatory modality in the digital copyright context.  In the Afterword of his 
text, Free Culture, he cites the examples of the Public Library of Science (“PLoS”)346 and 
the Creative Commons347 as non-profit organizations whose work aims to better balance 
the rights of the public to utilize copyright works against the commercial interests of 
content holders.  The PLoS is a nonprofit organization that maintains a repository of 
scientific work in electronic form that is made permanently available for free.348  The 
Creative Commons is a nonprofit corporation that aims to facilitate copyright holders in 
granting more flexible permissions for uses of their works.349  Creative Commons 
describes its mission as follows:  “Creative Commons provides free tools that let authors, 
scientists, artists, and educators easily mark their creative work with the freedoms they 
want it to carry. You can use CC to change your copyright terms from "All Rights 
Reserved" to "Some Rights Reserved”.”350 
 
The question for video privacy in the OSN context, and online privacy generally, 
is whether there are currently any institutions that could fulfill an institutional regulatory 
function, such as the function performed by the ALA in protecting library patrons’ 
intellectual privacy.  Because most of the players in the OSN privacy matrix are 
commercial enterprises and private Internet users, it is perhaps difficult to identify an 
analog to the ALA in the library context.  The closest obvious contenders are probably 
some public interest organizations that aim to protect rights and freedoms generally 
online.  Examples are the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”),351 and the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”).352   
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These organizations tend not to be particularly well funded,353 at least as compared 
with corporate interests.  They certainly do important work in advocating for the rights of 
Internet users who may not be able to protect their own privacy interests online because 
of collective action problems, or lack of knowledge about relevant law and technology.  
Perhaps part of the regulatory equation for protecting privacy online in the future should 
be to pay more attention to, and encourage funding for, organizations such as the EFF 
and EPIC.  At the very least, these kinds of institutions can play an important regulatory 
role, particularly in concert with public education in protecting online privacy.  These 
organizations already perform a public education role in the sense of the media coverage 
they obtain for their activities,354 and the public lectures their officers provide on online 
liberties.355  Their websites also contain much educational information about individual 
rights online.  It may be that greater focus on public education as a modality of regulation 
for online privacy could cast more light on the activities of organizations that are already 
attempting to publicize issues relating to individual freedoms online. 
 
Academic institutions are another example of largely non-profit institutions that 
can play an important public education role.356  They can assist in developing statements 
of best practices about online privacy, as well as disseminating information to the public 
about these issues.  This is already done in terms of academic conferences and symposia 
on these issues.357  However, a greater array of publications, and greater accessibility of 
conferences and conference proceedings, including free online availability,358 could be a 
useful aspect of the ongoing privacy regulation matrix.  Clearly public education and 
institutions as regulatory modalities have a lot of synergies between them, and could be 
more usefully employed in the future development of online privacy principles, alongside 
legal rules, social norms, market forces, and system architecture. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Privacy rights online have been of growing concern in the past decade or so as 
privacy destroying technologies increase in prevalence.359  As noted by Professor Solove, 
much of the destruction of privacy online is incidental to other activities being relatively 
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innocently, if somewhat carelessly, conducted by online actors.360  The rise of OSNs is yet 
another area in which those interacting relatively innocently online are creating 
potentially long term threats to individual privacy.  A number of regulatory avenues have 
already been identified to better protect digital privacy problems.  They include legal 
rules, social norms, market forces, system architecture, public education, and an 
enhanced role of institutions as regulators.  The problem is the pace of change and 
development of technologies for gathering and sharing both text-based and video/multi-
media information.  By the time the regulatory modalities have been effectively deployed 
to counteract new technological privacy problems, much personal information, including 
potentially damaging or embarrassing information in video formats, will already be 
widely displayed online.  It is now time to start thinking more carefully about the 
potential of each regulatory modality, and the most efficient way for the regulatory 
modalities to interact with each other to protect online privacy interests. 
 
This Article has examined a number of advantages and disadvantages of six 
distinct, yet interrelated, regulatory modalities.  It has considered ways in which these 
modalities could be employed to better protect privacy interests in digital images, noting 
that digital images raise privacy concerns that are often distinct from those that arise in 
relation to the gathering and dissemination of text-based data about individuals.  One of 
the most salient problems with digital video images is that the image subject is usually a 
different person to the person who originally captured the image and posted it online.  
The image taker may well be protected by copyright law, but this will be of no avail to 
the image subject seeking to protect her online privacy.   
 
One might argue that there is no need to focus on digital privacy, or more 
particularly digital video privacy, in the short term.  Commentators have suggested in the 
past that privacy is not a highly held value in cyberspace so there is no need to protect 
it.361  With respect to OSNs in particular, some would argue that privacy concerns are a 
“blip” phenomenon, and that time will educate Internet users to be more careful about 
video images and other information they place online, or allow to be placed online about 
them.362  However, these views are not universally accepted.  There are explanations for 
Internet users’ apparent lack of concern for privacy, including: (a) their lack of education 
about potential privacy breaches and impacts of those breaches on their lives, (b) the lack 
of forethought that young people often put into their actions while they are developing 
their lives and personalities and using OSNs to do so; and, (c) the lack of meaningful 
modes of protecting online privacy for those who want to take advantage of online 
services such as OSNs. 
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There is also a body of literature arguing that an attempt to regulate privacy online 
today is like locking the barn door after the horse has bolted.363  Some commentators have 
suggested that the appropriate approach to remedying privacy breaches in the 21st century 
is to focus on specific damages caused by leaks of personal information, including 
discrimination in the workplace, healthcare, and education.364  Indeed, some have 
suggested that the benefits of profiling and lack of privacy could theoretically outweigh 
the costs in the long term.365  In particular, Professor Strahilevitz has argued that the wide-
scale dissemination of personal information can actually help the public understand 
existing social norms.366   
 
However, there is reason to be skeptical of an approach that focuses not on 
protecting privacy, but solely on specific harms caused by resultant leaks of information.  
For one thing, many insecurities involving personal information do not result in specific 
harms in terms of possible racial profiling in health care, education, and employment, or 
even identity theft.367  In fact, many online privacy incursions do not result in any one 
specific harm, but rather in a general culture of unease where individuals cannot rely on 
anyone taking care or control over sensitive information about them.368   
 
Another objection to attempting to develop Internet privacy regulation arises from 
the global nature of the Internet.  Cyberspace has historically raised jurisdictional 
concerns – and the idea has been voiced that the Internet cannot369 and arguably should 
not be regulated because it would be tantamount to an attempt to impose one country’s 
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laws on the rest of the world.370  There are at least two answers to this argument.  The first 
is that history has shown that the Internet can be regulated and indeed has been 
effectively regulated in a number of areas – notably the protection of intellectual property 
rights online.371  The second is that difficulties inherent in Internet regulation depend to a 
large extent on the subject matter of the regulation.  In areas where cross-cultural views 
of particular problems can be aligned fairly easily on a substantive level, international 
regulation is not so difficult.   
 
Some domestic examples in a federal system can illustrate this point easily 
enough.  In the United States, legislatures at both the state and federal level have had 
much more trouble enacting legislation to protect minors from indecent and harmful 
online content372 than they have had in enacting legislation to curtail unsolicited 
commercial emails (or “spam”).373  One of the reasons why this has been the case is that 
there is less substantive disagreement between social groups about the contours of 
appropriate regulatory responses to spam374 than there is on defining content harmful to 
minors.375 
 
One of the leading privacy experts, Professor Solove, has suggested that despite 
disharmonization in terms of values and terminology ascribed to privacy protection in 
                                                 
370
  See, for example, Dow Jones & Co v Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (10 Dec 2002), ¶ 200 per Justice 
Callinan (“[W]hat the appellant seeks to do is to impose upon Australian residents for the purposes of this 
and many other cases, an American legal hegemony in relation to Internet publications.  The consequence, 
if the appellant’s submission were to be accepted would be to confer upon one country, and one notably 
more benevolent to the commercial and other media than this one, an effective domain over the law of 
defamation, to the financial advantage of publishers in the United States, and the serious disadvantage of 
those unfortunate enough to be reputationally damaged outside the United States.”) (available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2002/56.html, last viewed on July 25, 2008). 
371
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note ___, at 184 (“Control in the privacy context is 
seen as outlandish or impossible.  Copyright law demonstrates otherwise.  It reveals that the law is willing 
and able to control information.”) 
372
  See, for example, American Libraries Association v Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(striking down state law that made it illegal to distribute material harmful to minors over the Internet); Reno 
v American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down sections of federal Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 that attempted to limit the distribution of inappropriate content over the Internet); 
Ashcroft v American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (striking down sections of federal Child 
Online Protection Act that attempted to protect minors from inappropriate Internet content).  However, 
contrast these cases with United States v American Library Association, Inc, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (in which 
the Children’s Internet Protection Act was upheld with respect to conditioning government funding for 
libraries on their willingness to utilize filtering software to protect minors from inappropriate material 
online).   
373
  State of Washington v Heckel, 122  Wn. App. 60; 93 P. 3d 189 (2004) (upholding state legislation 
restricting certain aspects of unsolicited commercial email).  
374
  See, for example, State of Washington v Heckel, 143 Wn.2d 824, 837-838; 24 P.3d 404,411-412; 
(2001); aff’d 122  Wn. App. 60; 93 P. 3d 189 (2004) (noting that different state laws regulating unsolicited 
commercial email were drafted in substantially the same terms, so that it was not imposing an undue 
burden on a defendant to require him to comply with a given state’s laws for the purposes of the Dorment 
Commerce Clause analysis).   
375
  See, for example, Ashcroft v American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 577 (2002) 
(describing a law’s attempts to regulate online speech with relation to “community standards” as being 
problematic because community standards are widely divergent in different geographic areas even within 
the United States). 
REGULATING ONLINE PRIVACY 
  61 
different countries, there is “a significant degree of consensus about the kinds of 
problems involved.”376  If this is indeed the case, globalization arguably does not pose a 
significant problem to privacy regulation.  Laws and social norms identified in one 
country are unlikely to be strikingly dissimilar to those in other countries.  Additionally, 
as pointed out by Professors Edwards and Brown, technological solutions to privacy 
problems can easily have a global reach.377  Thus, if there is relative consensus on aims of 
privacy regulation amongst cultures, this enables laws and norms to develop that 
effectively have a global reach and that can easily enough be bolstered by globally 
applicable technological solutions to privacy problems.  Regulators could also achieve 
global economies of scale in public education initiatives if the concerns of the public in 
different countries are largely the same in substance. 
 
Many commentators have indicated that a multi-pronged regulatory approach is 
necessary with respect to cyberspace generally.378  Others have applied this view to 
privacy protections more specifically.379  This work has been extremely important and 
useful and must continue to be extended to deal with new privacy issues as they arise 
online.  One of the newer issues is the relative lack of privacy protection for video images 
and other multi-media files shared over OSNs.  The above discussion has utilized this 
example to demonstrate how a multi-pronged regulatory approach can address these 
social concerns in ways that fill in gaps in the current legal matrix for privacy protection.  
Exercises like this will continue to be necessary in the future as new technologies arise 
that enable new types of privacy incursions.  This article has demonstrated the need to 
think in terms of often intricate and detailed interactions of various regulatory approaches 
in order to achieve more appropriate balances of privacy rights and other interests in 
cyberspace.  It will hopefully serve as a useful model for future discourse on online 
privacy protections more generally. 
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